# 1AC

### 1AC—Engagement

#### Contention one is engagement—

#### U.S. thought concerning Latin America relegates the region to political irrelevance. Our hemispheric strategy is permeated with outright neglect towards a region that U.S. policymakers regard with ambivalence and disdain

Wiarda 1999 (Howard J., “United States Policy Toward Latin America: A New Era of Benign Neglect”, in Neighborly Adversaries: Readings in U.S.-Latin American Relations, Ed Michael LaRosa and Frank O. Mora, p.257-263)

Like Falcoff, Howard Wiarda, a well-known Latin Americanist and foreign policy expert who has taught at National Defense University, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies and currently works at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, is doubtful that Washington will pay much attention to Latin America with the end of the Cold War. He suggests the historically low priority of Latin America within the U.S. foreign policy community would again be the case with the end of the Cold War. At best, we are entering an era of "benign neglect." Latin America would be left to solve its own problems with only scant encouragement from Washington, according to Wiarda. Public opinion polls in the United States have shown a low level of empathy for or patience with Latin America. Wiarda states that US. policy interests are "likely to be sporadic and episodic rather than sustained" and that relations will be driven by domestic political considerations. This last point, as it relates to issues such as immigration and drug trafficking, has proven prophetic. In hindsight, however, the level of engagement since 1990 has been much more intense than Wiarda suggested in 1990, particularly as it relates to trade, drug trafficking, and summitry. Interestingly, Wiarda states here that benign neglect, rather than sparking concern or criticism in Latin America, would be welcomed because of the absence of interventionism. Latin America's standing in Washington, D.C., among the U.S. foreign policy community, and in terms of the rank ordering of foreign policy areas of priority, is precarious at best. Latin America has always been rather low on our priorities but now it runs the risk of slipping further still—almost out of sight. Ignored and viewed as unimportant, Latin America is in danger of falling to the level of sub-Saharan Africa as a region that some poor assistant secretary must be responsible for but that is seen as hopeless and not worth paying serious attention to. Many in the general foreign policy community (as distinct from Latin Americanists) see Latin America as a "black hole" into which are sucked immense amounts of U.S. aid and effort, as well as hopes and dreams, but out of which comes nothing in return except despair and grief. It is not a great time in Washington, D.C., to be a Latin America specialist or one with hopes for U.S. policy for the area. Paradoxically, while the U.S. is devoting little serious attention to Latin America, U.S. relations with the area are good—better than they have been in at least fifteen years. Moreover, it is precisely at this time of "benign neglect" on the part of the United States that the area is undergoing some of the most far-reaching cultural and structural changes ever in its history. These paradoxes need to be explored in further detail. Latin America's Isolation The reasons for Latin America's poor standing in Washington and among the policy community are various, relating both to changes in the U.S. and in global power relations. One main reason is the winding down of the Cold War. As citizens we may applaud the ending of the Cold War and as professional Latin Americanists we may lament the reasoning involved, but the undeniable fact is the Cold War was the main reason for U.S. interest in the region over the last forty years. Without the Cold War the U.S. will be less interested in Latin America, less inclined to assist it (witness the difficulty of generating aid to Nicaragua now that the Sandanistas are out of power), and less interested in "bailing it out," with Marines or dollars, when Latin America gets in trouble. Nor, in the absence of any credible Soviet or Cuban threat, will clever Latin American politicians be able to play off the superpowers against each other or run to Washington or the local U.S. embassy with stories of potential "Communist" takeovers unless we come to their assistance. The ending of the Cold War has changed all the "givens" of the last four decades. There will therefore be no Marshall Plan for Latin America, no Alliance for Progress, little foreign aid. In addition, as the world organizes into regional trading blocs (Europe, East Asia, North America), Latin America runs the risk of being completely left out of the possibilities for prosperity that will accrue to the countries within these blocs. When that prospect is added to Latin America's other economic problems of capital flight, lack of investment from virtually any source, debt, and actual disinvestment by foreign firms, the prospects look dismal indeed. Not only is the United States not very concerned with Latin America— except sporadically and as U.S. interests are directly affected—but other possible sources of support are drying up as well. There will, given their own economic problems, clearly be no or meager assistance from the Soviet Union, China, or Eastern Europe. Japan has been very selective in terms of its investments in Latin America, limiting most of its activities to parts of Brazil and Mexico along the border area. Europe is also preoccupied with its further integration in 1992; and its attention and assistance to, and investments in, Latin America have been declining in recent years. These trends imply that one of the more ambitious of the panaceas for Latin America in recent years, that of diversifying its dependence, will simply not work out because no one else is really interested. That means that Latin America has de facto been thrown back into the arms of the United States, whether we or the Latin Americans wish it or not. But not only in the wake of the Cold War is the United States not very committed at the policy level, but at the popular level Latin America has never had a worse reputation in the U.S. Latin America is broadly assumed to be, the opinion surveys tell us, an area of drugs and dictators. It is perceived as a region where U.S. tourists are preyed upon, where parents are reluctant to allow their children to go on exchange programs, of brutality, violence, and inefficiency. In addition, uncontrolled immigration from the area is widely seen as adding to U.S. crime problems and of putting inordinate burdens on school systems, social welfare programs, and law enforcement. Many of these characterizations are of course false and based on inaccurate stereotypes, but unfortunately that is how the public tends to view Latin America, a perception that is inevitably reflected also in congressional votes and Administration policy. Bush Administration Policy The Bush Administration coming into office in January, 1989, recognized full well the bad reputation and domestic political traps of dealing with Latin America. James Baker, Mr. Bush's campaign manager and then his secretary of state, was known to feel that Central America was a "can of worms." Mr. Baker determined that moving to the left on Central America would anger conservatives, President Reagan's constituency which Bush could ill afford to lose, while moving to the right would mean the Administration would "get it" from the religious and human rights lobbies. Far better, he reasoned, to get Latin America off the front burner, off the nation's front pages and television screens, indeed off the agenda of foreign policy issues altogether so that it could do no political harm. These were of course all domestic political considerations, enabling the new Administration to finesse Latin America and concentrate on higher priority issues. In 1990 I published a book on U.S. foreign policy-making in which I estimated that 80 percent of U.S. policy considerations on Latin America derive from domestic political considerations rather than having much to do with Latin America per se; under Secretary Baker, who wants above all else to see his president be reelected in 1992, that figure should be closer to 90 percent. Virtually everything the Administration has done with regard to Latin America has had these domestic considerations as preeminent: get it off the agenda and defuse its potential to do political damage. The assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs was chosen not for his expertise on Latin America but because he was a Democrat who would thus be acceptable to the congressional leadership and because he had once writ-ten part of a speech favoring aid to the Contras, which made him accept-able to conservatives. A political compromise was then worked out with the congressional Democrats under which the Administration went along with some aspects of the Arias Plan, but in return got room for Mr. Bush to concentrate on the European summit and his meetings with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, which Secretary Baker considered far more important politically than anything that could possibly come out of Central America. The Brady Plan, which was really an extension of the Baker Plan de-vised when the secretary of state was secretary of treasury in the previous administration, helped defuse the Latin American debt issue and get it off the front pages without the expenditure of very many U.S. government dollars and without the taxpayers becoming aware that it was they who would eventually have to carry much of the burden. Strengthening the Organization of American States (OAS) was seen as a way of letting that agency handle (and thus receive attention for) inter-American disputes, rather than the blame for the area's problems always falling on the United States. The ouster of General Manuel Noriega by U.S. forces, which would most likely eventually have been carried out in the domestic Panamanian political process, was ordered only after Noriega had frustrated all earlier efforts and when he had become a political embarrassment to President Bush domestically. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is similarly a wonderful rhetorical gesture and it may even produce some results, but it carries almost no U.S. financial commitment and there is as yet precious little flesh on the bare bones of the policy. Quite a number of these programs merit our applause—particularly given the fact that the political climate in Washington is not ripe for any vast new assistance programs and that the public attitudes are so poisonous. The debt issue has not gone away or been resolved but its dimensions have been reduced and it is less troublesome; the OAS needed to be strengthened; Noriega needed to go. In Central America diplomatic negotiations led to the holding of democratic and free elections in Nicaragua and serious peace talks are underway between the government and the rebels in El Salvador. Some economic assistance is flowing to the area and the democratic openings, while incomplete in many cases, are encouraging. The policy has been successful even while the motives—domestic politics—remain suspect. In addition, the skill of the persons executing the policy has been impressive. As assistant secretary, Bernard Aronson has been indefatigable, careful, prudent, balanced, and patient. He has managed to eke out "some benefits for Latin America" even though the Washington climate is decidedly not propitious. And surely Secretary Baker's grand strategy of removing Central America from the headlines and reducing its potential for domestic damage and foreign policy divisiveness—whatever one thinks of the results and implications of the policy—was very cleverly and skillfully carried out from a political and technical point of view. Latin America's standing in Washington and in the country at large may be terrible but the strategies carried out in the crevices have been quite skillful. It may be a policy of benign neglect but it is handled deftly.The New Issue Given the new, often disparaging, climate in Washington regarding Latin America, as well as the Bush Administration strategy of benign neglect, what can we expect in the way of policy regarding the major issues in the area? 1. Foreign aid. There will be no major assistance programs for Latin America. The money is unavailable and Congress is reluctant to spend the funds. If there is a modest "peace dividend" from the winding down of the Cold War and the reduction of the Defense Department budget, it will go chiefly to fund domestic social and economic programs, not foreign aid. Yet, Latin America will continue to receive some assistance. 2. Trade. Protectionist sentiment in the Congress is strong and rising. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is useful but it carries little financial commitment. Latin America will have to reform its economies from within and stop blaming its problems on "dependence" because in the wake of the Cold War the United States will not come to its rescue anymore. 3. Immigration from Latin America will be a source of friction further souring relations; the U.S. will launch new but ineffective efforts to solve the problem at the sending country level. 4. Drugs. As the U.S. designs a more effective program to deal with drugs and as drug consumption in the U.S is increasingly viewed as an inner-city problem, less attention will be paid to the issue—and to Latin America. 5. Debt. The debt issue has been politically "solved": the banks are now out from under and the U.S. government has figured out how to hide from taxpayers the fact that they will be paying most of the burden. So this issue will also command less attention. 6. The environment will receive some sporadic attention but since the sources of the problems are far away (the Brazilian Amazon) and responsibility murky, it will not receive sustained policy priority. 7. Democracy and human rights. The U.S. government will continue to support democracy and human rights on pragmatic (democracies do not muck around in their neighbors' internal affairs), political (democracies cause less grief in U.S. domestic politics), as well as moral grounds; but some of the steam has gone out of the earlier Reagan Administration campaign for democracy and we should not be surprised to see a reversion to authoritarianism in 3-4 countries. 8. Security. There are still problem areas (Peru, Cuba, Central America, the Caribbean); but with the Soviet presence diminishing and Cuba's revolution increasingly seen as a failure, U.S. security interests and involvement in the area will be occasional rather than constant. This is a too-brief discussion, but even in abbreviated form such a run-down of the main policy issues in U.S.-Latin American relations is revealing. It suggests that U.S. policy interests in the area are likely to be sporadic and episodic rather than sustained; that U.S. interests in trade and other areas will be heavily driven by domestic political considerations; that such issues as immigration and drugs lead to more poisonous rather than better relations; and that Latin America is likely to be on its own more than at any time in the last thirty years. Overall what is striking is that there is no one issue, or combination of issues, that seems likely to achieve the sustained attention and funding from the U.S. Congress or the Administration that the Cold War did for the last forty years. Conclusion There is not only less U.S. official interest in Latin America now that the Cold War is fading but, the polls tell us, less public patience and empathy as well. Latin America may have reached its nadir in terms of overall U.S. interest and inclination to assist the area. At high policy levels the main issues and policy debates are viewed as decided; what Latin America requires, the consensus says, is democracy, open markets, privatization, export promotion, a cleaning up of its own "act" (corruption, overbureaucratization, and the like). Since we now "know" the answers and there are no other viable alternatives, it is up to Latin America to solve its own problems. The end of the Cold War gives Latin America less room to maneuver between the superpowers, and Europe's declining interest means Latin America has less opportunity to reduce or diversify its dependency. Hence Latin America is on its own as it has not been for the last thirty years; it can sink or swim, but Latin America must solve its own internal problems since, with the Cold War waning, no one else will do it for the area. Neither singularly nor collectively do any of the new issues—ecology, drugs, debt, etc.—promise to deliver as much for Latin America in terms of interest or Congressional budgetary support as did the Cold War for nearly half a century. The Brady Plan and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative are useful, but there is little substance as yet to these proposals. Hence the policy can be characterized as "benign neglect" with some occasional, more dramatic involvement (as in Panama)—although from the point of view of U.S. policymakers, given the budgetary and other domes-tic constraints, they are doing about as much for Latin America in terms of attention and aid as it is possible to do in the present circumstances. The most interesting aspect is that Latin America's adept leaders understand all this and are already operating on the assumption that U.S. Latin America policy largely stops at the Mexican, or maybe El Salvadoran, border. From their point of view the absence of moralizing as under Carter or of sometimes heavy-handedness as under Reagan is to be welcomed. In their view "benign neglect" is comparable to the policy of the "Good Neighbor" because while it means little or no assistance, it also means little or no U.S. interference.

#### This form of benign neglect manifests itself through selective intervention. The United States picks-and-chooses when and how to engage Latin America, doing so only with a self-serving concern for our own security and economic interests. This ideology dictates our thinking; we only care about Latin America when it’s useful for us to do so

Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2005 (Craig, David, “Transforming Latin America: The International and Domestic Origins of Change”, p.219-221)

Policy Implications Knowing when and why foreign forces matter to the conduct of events in Latin America takes on policy salience as well. As Latin America moves into the twenty-first century, it faces problems of considerable gravity: democracies that are weakly institutionalized, governments that perform poorly or not at all militaries that are asked to fill functional gaps, crime and insecurity that sweep through once relatively safe and secure communities, courts that fail to bring perpetrators to justice, poverty that reaches up and grabs vast portions of an erst-while middle class, double-digit unemployment rates, and indigenous populations at the very bottom who will not wait any longer for a slice of the pie. The political life spans of Latin America's leaders have grown progressively shorter as they either cannot or will not remedy these ills; worse still, they are sometimes part of the problem. It is always at times of great frustration and great need when the question is asked: what will the wealthier industrialized countries offer this beleaguered region? And specifically, what will the United States offer? The answer is not comforting, but it is at least more comprehensible once viewed through the lens of our framework. The United States is not likely to invest any significant resources or effort in a campaign of direct economic or social assistance targeted at in-need populations. This is not a bold prediction course; the foreign aid spigot was more or less turned off years ago and remains closed. Naturally there have been both ideological and fiscal changes in the United States in recent decades that can account for the diminished importance of foreign aid. But the problem goes beyond the hegemony of fiscal conservatism to one of general hegemonic attention and motivation. U.S. governments—-whether Democratic or Republican controlled—have very little interest in any of the aforementioned problems, and less interest still in doing anything about them. Their lack of interest derives from a perception that the burdens of the region's poor, its workers, its unemployed, its peasants, its pensioners indeed its average citizens, generate no imminent threats to U.S. national interests, and efforts to assist them generate no tangible benefits in return. These are low politics difficulties that do not reach out and grab the attention of powerful executives or lawmakers from the North. This view is not just a kind of bias toward the impoverished masses. The U.S. government demonstrates an equally indifferent attitude toward the elites. It refuses to commit significant attention, expertise, or sums of money to strengthen and reform Latin America's courts, legislatures, police units, defense ministries, and other institutions of the democratic state. Elites desperately need stronger institutions if they are to govern effectively. But however vital democratic deepening may be to Latin America's future, it just does not appear on Washington's radar screen because it too resides in the realm of low politics, meaning the stakes are appreciably lower for foreign states. Scholars can wax eloquent about how the afflictions of poverty, unemployment, crime, the environment, institutional decay, and human rights left unattended now will fester and create crises that will eventually harm U.S. interests. But the arguments fall on deaf ears to policy makers who view the long term as very long indeed and who are eager to discount the future costs to their current inaction. Unless Latin America's low politics problems can cause considerable and immediate angst at a national level within the United States, they will not become a political agenda item in Washington. Washington's attention deficit is selective, and issue sensitive. Within the high politics realm of economics, the United States is willing (with some misgivings) to work toward the creation of a free trade zone with its Latin American partners. It is ideologically predisposed to do so, and it envisions a short- to medium-term gain in the form of new, expanded, and unrestricted markets for U.S. exporters and investors. But it is much less willing to associate free trade with low politics reforms within Latin American states that would humanize the workplace, boost wages, or create jobs. In the longer term, assisting Latin American workers and unemployed should, in theory, rebound to the benefit of the United States by bolstering disposable incomes, which in turn would mean greater consumption of very competitive U.S. goods. Even though there is a logical linkage between these sets of issues, it is still perceived as an indirect and less urgent connection and one that Washington policy makers seldom make. They would rather place their bets on a free trade deal alone that quickly solidifies their nation's export earnings and profit remittances. Similar issue splits are visible elsewhere. The United States wants Latin American armed forces to leap into wars against guerrillas and terrorists but shows little concern that military immersion in these campaigns might have negative consequences for professionalism, democratic society, and civilian control in those countries. It devotes scant resources to help fully professionalize those forces and less still to equip civilians with the tools they need to institutionalize control over their soldiers. It wants its Southern neighbors to fight hard against transnational crime but will not help finance judicial reform that would allow Latin American courts to process their criminal caseloads more efficiently and prosecute more frequently, or help fund police reform to reduce the rampant corruption of those units. The United States visualizes the struggle against left-wing insurgents, terrorists, and their criminal associates as high-stakes contests of high politics that must be won to enhance its own national security and that of its allies in those struggles; it does not visualize improvements in Latin American civil-military relations or judicial and police systems in quite the same way. In not addressing the latter issues, the United States may be cutting off its nose to spite its face. Without low politics reforms to assist Latin American judges, police, investigators, soldiers, and their civilian managers, those groups will be less equipped to lend a hand in transnational struggles deemed vital by Washington. But so it goes. The hegemon's indifference to these groups and their problems persists, and the balance of influence remains tilted in the direction of domestic politics and away from the foreign. On these issues, Latin America is left to fend for itself, and only time will tell whether its independence proves to be a blessing or a curse.

#### Even when the U.S. does choose to engage, we do so in a manner that disregards the interests of the people of Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela and of every other country in the region. U.S. neoliberal interventions may have “secured” our narrow, strategic interests – but – they have resulted in ongoing violence against the people of Latin America

Hattingh 2008(Shawn, International Labour Research and Information Group, “ALBA: Creating a Regional Alternative to Neoliberalism?”, Monthly Review, <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2008/hattingh070208.html>, 7/2/8)

ALBA: Creating a Regional Alternative to Neo-liberalism? by Shawn Hattingh Latin America was the first place where the US imposed the most callous economic system ever seen: neo-liberal capitalism. Starting in Chile in 1973, the US used its power, along with its control over the IMF and the World Bank, to force governments across Latin America to adopt neo-liberal economic policies. This has seen Latin American countries embrace trade liberalization, financial liberalization, privatization, and labor market flexibility. Of course, US multinationals benefited from this. They have snapped up ex-state owned assets throughout Latin America at bargain basement prices. With the reduction of tariffs and the advent of "free" trade, US multinationals have also flooded Latin America with cheap exports. This has seen US multinationals making massive profits. The people of Latin America have paid for this. Since the advent of neo-liberalism, inequality in Latin America has grown, and millions of people have lost their jobs along with their access to healthcare and education.1

#### U.S. selective engagement is based on the same violent ideology that drove European exploitation of Latin America in the nineteenth century – neoliberalism is simply the new face of mercantilist subjugation

Grosfoguel 2000 (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California Berkeley, “Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America”, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347-374)

**Developmentalism became a global ideology of the capitalist world-economy. In the Latin American periphery these ideas were appropriated** in the late eighteenth century **by** the Spanish Creole **elites, who** adapted them to their own agenda. Since most of the elites were linked to, or part of, the agrarian landowner class, which produced goods through coerced forms of labor to sell for a profit in the world market, **they were** very **eclectic in their selection of which Enlightenment ideas they wished to utilize. Free trade and** national **sovereignty** were ideas **they defended** as part of their struggle against the Spanish colonial monopoly of trade. **However, for racial and class reasons**, the modern **ideas about individual freedom, rights** of man, **and equality were underplayed**. There were no major social transformations of Latin American societies after the inde- pendence revolutions of the first half of the nineteenth century. The Creole **elites left untouched the colonial noncapitalist forms of coerced labor as well as the racial/ethnic hierarchies**. White Creole **elites maintained** after independence **a racial hierarchy where** Indians, blacks, mestizos, mulattoes and other racially oppressed groups were located at the bottom. This is what Aníbal Quijano (1993) calls “coloniality of power.” During the nineteenth century, Great Britain had become the new core power and the new model of civilization. The Latin American Creole **elites established a discursive opposition between** Spain’s **“backwardness**, obscurantism and feudalism” **and** Great Britain’s “advanced, **civilized** and modern” nation. Leopoldo Zea, paraphrasing José Enrique Rodó, called this the new “northernmania” (nordomanía), that is, the attempt by Creole elites to see new “models” in the North that would stimulate develop- ment while in turn developing new forms of colonialism (Zea 1986, 16–17). **The** subsequent nineteenth-century **characterization** by the Creole elites **of Latin America as “feudal” or in a backward “stage” served to** justify Latin American subordination to the new masters from the North and is part of what I call “feudalmania,” which would continue throughout the twentieth century. Feudalmania was a device of “temporal distancing” (Fabian 1983) to produce a knowledge that denied coevalness between Latin America and the so-called advanced European countries. The denial of coevalness created a double ideological mechanism. First, it concealed European responsibil- ity in the exploitation of the Latin American periphery. By not sharing the same historical time and existing in different geographical spaces, each region’s destiny was conceived as unrelated to each other region’s. Second, living different **temporalities, where Europe was said to be at a more advanced stage of development than Latin America, reproduced a notion of European superiority.** Thus Europe was the “model” to imitate and the developmentalist goal was to “catch up.” **This is expressed in the dichotomy civilization/barbarism** seen in figures such as Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in Argentina. **The use of both neomercantilist and liberal economic ideas enabled** the **nineteenth-century** Iberoamerican **elites** **to** oscillate between protectionist and free-trade positions **depending on** the **fluctuations** of the world economy. **When they were benefiting** from producing agrarian or mining exports in the international division of labor dominated at the time by British imperialism, **liberal economic theories provided them with the rational justification** for their role and goals. **But when foreign competition or a world economic crisis was affecting their exports** to the world market, **they shifted production toward the internal markets and employed neomercantilist arguments to justify protectionist policies. In** Chile, Argentina, and **Mexico there were neomercantilist and economic nationalist arguments** that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school1 and by some of the dependentis- tas (Potasch 1959; Frank 1970; Chiaramonte 1971). For example, the 1870s developmentalist debate was the most important economic debate in Ar- gentina during the nineteenth century and one of the most important in Latin America. An industrial development plan using protectionist neomercantilist policies was proposed. This movement was led by a profes- sor of political economy at the University of Buenos Aires and member of the Cámara de Diputados, Vicente F. López. López’s group was supported by the agrarian landowners, artisans, peasants, and incipient industrial cap- italists. Although all of them were protectionists, not all were economic nationalists. The protectionist position of the agrarian landowners was due to the 1866 and 1873 world economic crises, which had negatively affected export prices on wool, Argentina’s major export item at the time. Thus López promoted the development of a national cloth industry as a tran- sitional solution to the world depression. The movement ended once the wool producers shifted to cattle raising and meat exports. However, the group of deputies led by López developed neomer- cantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school and by some of the dependentistas. Influenced by the late 1830s Argen- tinean romantic generation (e.g., Juan Bautista Alberdi, Esteban Echevar- ria), López defended a historicist/idiographic approach against the univer- salism of liberal political economists (Chiaramonte 1971, 128–29, 133–34). According to López, the idea of free trade is not an absolute principle; rather, its application depends on the particular conditions of each coun- try. If free trade was beneficial for the industrial development of foreign countries, in the Argentinean case, where different industrial and eco- nomic structures were present, free trade was not a solution. In the first phase of industrial development, industries need protection from foreign competition. As one of the protectionist group members, Lucio V. López, said in 1873, “It is a mistake to believe that political economy offers and contains inmutable principles for all nations” (Chiaramonte 1971, 129–30). This critique of the nomothetic/universalist approach of core state intellec- tuals is even stronger in the thesis of one of Vicente F. López’s disciples, Aditardo Heredia, who attacked European intellectuals’ social conceptions as ahistorical and metaphysical. Heredia criticized in particular the Eu- ropean Enlightenment thinkers for aspiring to develop a social science guided by universal and inflexible principles, similar to geometric theorems or algebraic formulas, without attention to the peculiar historical condi- tions of each nation (130). Carlos Pellegrini, one of the leading protectionist deputies, said as early as 1853 that Adam Smith’s beautiful deductions did not pay enough attention to an aspect that influences all human institutions: time (133). The debate was a classical nomothetic-idiographic confronta- tion. The Argentinean scholars opposed a theory based on a concept of an eternal time/space with more particularistic and historicist arguments. The originality of their arguments was to articulate an economic policy in support of a nationalist industrialization project in the periphery of the world economy and to identify relations with England as part of the source of Argentina’s underdevelopment. The economic nationalism of Vicente F. López and his group offered a critique of the dependent relations of Argentina with England and other European centers as early as the 1870s (Chiaramonte 1971, 192–93). Regarding this point, we can quote the following statements made by this protectionist group, which can show some similarities with certain CEPAL-dependentista positions one hundred years later: It is very beautiful...to speak of free trade...this word freedom . . . is so beautiful! But we must understand freedom. **For the English who favor free trade, freedom is to allow English factories to manufacture the foreign products, to allow the English merchant to sell the foreign product. This type of freedom transforms the rest of the world into tributary countries; while England is the only nation that enjoys freedom, the remainder are tributary nations**; but I do not understand free trade in this manner. By free trade I understand an exchange of finished goods for finished goods. The day our wool can be exported not in the form of a raw material, but rather as a finished frock coat in exchange for England’s iron needles or clock strings, then I would accept free trade, that is, a fin- ished product from our country for a finished product from England. But if free trade consists of sending our wool . . . so England may wash it (when I speak of England I also mean Eu- rope and the rest of the world), manufacture it, and sell it to us through English merchants, brought on English ships and sold by English agents, I do not understand; this is not free trade, this is making a country that does not possess this industry a tributary country. Thus, let’s follow the path of protectionism, given that if we see the history of the manufacturing countries, we will find that their progress is due to protectionism. (Speech by Finance Minister Rufino Varela in the legislature in 1876; cited in Chiaramonte 1971, 182–83) In the English Parliament, one of the illustrious defenders of free trade said that he would like, upholding his doctrine, to make of England the factory of the world and of America the farm of England. He said something very true . . . that to a great extent has been realized, because in effect we are and will be for a long time, if we do not solve this problem, the farm of the great manufacturing nations. (Speech by Carlos Pellegrini at the Cámara de Diputados in 1875; 189) It is impossible to be independent when a country is not self- sufficient, when it does not have all it needs to consume. . . . I know well what the remedies are: they are to have capital to pay ourselves for the elaboration of products and their adaptation for consumption. Only in this way would the country have independence and credit and be saved through its own efforts. (Speech by Vicente F. López at the Cámara de Diputados in 1875; 27) It has been recognized that political independence cannot exist without industrial and mercantile independence. (Speech by a protectionist deputy in 1874; 192) (It is not necessary) to be permanently dependent on foreign capital. . . . I am completely opposed to the establishment of companies with foreign capital. (Deputy Seeber in 1877; 185) Although this nationalist group was questioning the tenets of tra- ditional liberal political economy and the location of Argentina within the world division of labor (Chiaramonte 1971, 193), it is important to indicate that they were committed to a nationalist liberalism. They de- fended protectionism as a transitory, although necessary, stage to direct the country toward economic liberalism. They criticized the supporters of the free-market doctrine because this policy maintained the subordination of Argentina to England. They wished to restrict momentarily the full im- plementation of economic liberalism as a means of achieving it later: The newborn industries needed protection, but once they grew, free markets should be encouraged (191). This doctrine is very close to those of the Ger- man political economist Frederich List and the North American Casey, who also promoted protectionism against England as a necessary develop- mental stage. However, although their names were mentioned several times during the 1870s parliamentary debate (135), the dominant influence upon the Argentinian protectionists in the 1870s came from their own intellec- tual tradition (134–35). In sum, **they were commited to national capitalist development through the formation of a local industrial bourgeoisie.** Other **countries in Latin America, such as Mexico** (Potasch 1959) and Chile (Frank 1970) **had similar debates** during the nineteenth century. Probably the most extreme case in terms of the free-trade and protectionist debates was nineteenth-century Paraguay, where a protectionist regime led by Dr. Francia and the López family was destroyed by a military inter- vention of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, aided by the British, to install a free-trade regime. Six out of seven Paraguayan males were killed in the Triple Alliance War. This war was a turning point for the triumph of the free-trade doctrine, which dominated in Latin America during the nineteenth century, the period of British hegemony. Agrarian and mining capitalists profited from selling raw materials or crops to, and buying man- ufactured products from, the British, rather than attempting to compete with them through industrialization. By the end of the nineteenth century, Spencerian **evolutionism** and Comtian scientism joined forces to form the Latin American version of positivism, which **provided the ideological justification for both the** economic subordination **to the “empire of free trade” and the political domination of the dictatorships of “order and progress.” Scientism, progress, truth, property, evolutionary stagism, and order were all** Enlightenment themes reproduced in Auguste Comte’s positivist and Herbert Spencer’s evolution- ary doctrines. They were both **used in the Latin American periphery to justify the penetration of foreign capital investments and to promote economic liberalism against “backwardness” and “feudalism.”** **Evolutionary stagism, inevitable progress, and optimism in science and technology combined to form a teleological view of human history that strengthened the basis of developmentalist ideology**. As a result of the U.S. military invasions in the region, the Mexican revolution in 1910, and the disillusionment with liberalism during the First World War, a new wave of nationalism emerged among Latin American elites. **Once again, after the First World War, there was a radical questioning of economic liberalism, this time focused against the** new hegemon in the region, the **United States** of America.

#### It’s not simply about political economics, rather, this ideology is rooted in a racialized contempt towards difference that marginalizes those who don’t fit neatly into our black-white dichotomy of race relations—it’s not a question of the black-white paradigm as a tool for education, it’s a question of our society’s conception of race as fitting into neat divides

Martinez 1994 (Elizabeth, Chicana activist, author, and educator, March, “Seeing More Than Black & White: Latinos, racism, and the cultural divides” http://www.indigenouspeople.net/blackwht.htm)

A certain relish seems irresistible to this Latina as the mass media has been compelled to sit up, look south of the border, and take notice. Probably the Chiapas uprising and Mexico's recent political turmoil have won us no more than a brief day in the sun. Or even less: liberal Ted Koppel still hadn't noticed the historic assassination of presidential candidate Colosio three days afterward. But it's been sweet, anyway. When Kissinger said years ago "nothing important ever happens in the south," he articulated a contemptuous indifference toward Latin America, its people and their culture which has long dominated U.S. institutions and attitudes. Mexico may be great for a vacation and some people like burritos but the usual image of Latin America combines incompetence with absurdity in loud colors. My parents, both Spanish teachers, endured decades of being told kids were better off learning French. U.S. political culture is not only Anglo-dominated but also embraces an exceptionally stubborn national self-centeredness, with no global vision other than relations of domination. The U.S. refuses to see itself as one nation sitting on a continent with 20 others all speaking languages other than English and having the right not to be dominated. Such arrogant indifference extends to Latinos within the U.S. The mass media complain, "people can't relate to Hispanics" - or Asians, they say. Such arrogant indifference has played an important role in invisibilizing La Raza (except where we become a serious nuisance or a handy scapegoat). It is one reason the U.S. harbors an exclusively white-on-Black concept of racism. It is one barrier to new thinking about racism which is crucial today. There are others. Good-bye White Majority In a society as thoroughly and violently racialized as the United States, white-Black relations have defined racism for centuries. Today the composition and culture of the U.S. are changing rapidly. We need to consider seriously whether we can afford to maintain an exclusively white/Black model of racism when the population will be 32 percent Latino, Asian/Pacific American and Native American - in short, neither Black nor white - by the year 2050. We are challenged to recognize that multi-colored racism is mushrooming, and then strategize how to resist it. We are challenged to move beyond a dualism comprised of two white supremacist inventions: Blackness and Whiteness. At stake in those challenges is building a united anti-racist force strong enough to resist contemporary racist strategies of divide-and- conquer. Strong enough, in the long run, to help defeat racism itself. Doesn't an exclusively Black/white model of racism discourage the perception of common interests among people of color and thus impede a solidarity that can challenge white supremacy? Doesn't it encourage the isolation of African Americans from potential allies? Doesn't it advise all people of color to spend too much energy understanding our lives in relation to Whiteness, and thus freeze us in a defensive, often self- destructive mode?

#### This makes extermination of the Latin American other an imperative

Lander 2000 (Edgardo, Professor of Social Sciences at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, “Eurocentrism and Colonialism in Latin American Social Thought”, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 3, p. 519-532)

Political and social thought regarding Latin America has been historically characterized by a tension between the search for its specific attributes and an external view that has seen these lands from the narrow perspective of European experience. There has also been an opposition between the challenge of the rich potentialities of this New World and distress over its difference, which stands in contrast with the ideal represented by European culture and racial composition. Nonetheless, external colonial views and regrets because of the difference have been widely hegemonic. A brief revision of the texts of the first republican constitutions is enough to illustrate how liberals, in their attempt to transplant and install a replica of their understanding of the European or North American experience, almost completely ignore the specific cultural and historical conditions of the societies about which they legislate. When these conditions are considered, it is with the express purpose of doing away with them. The affliction because of the difference—the awkwardness of living in a continent that is not white, urban, cosmopolitan, and civilized— finds its best expression in positivism. Sharing the main assumptions and prejudices of nineteenth-century European thought (scientific racism, patriarchy, the idea of progress), positivism reaffirms the colonial discourse. The continent is imagined from a single voice, with a single subject: white, masculine, urban, cosmopolitan. The rest, the majority, is the “other,” barbarian, primitive, black, Indian, who has nothing to contribute to the future of these societies. It would be imperative to whiten, westernize, or exterminate that majority.

#### Specifically, the combination of racial stigmatization and economic nationalist ideology guarantees unimaginably heinous violence

Radcliffe, 2007 (Sarah A., Senior Lecturer in Latin American Geography at the University of Cambridge, “Forum: Latin American Indigenous Geographies of Fear: Living in the Shadow of Racism, Lack of Development, and Antiterror Measures” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 97, No. 2, Jun., 2007, Project Muse)

Currently, neoliberalism is the hegemonic development model in Latin America such that the majority of regional development priorities and projects have been shaped by the theory, interpretation, and implementation of neoliberalism. As such, the region offers an ideal location in which to evaluate this development model in terms of its ability to address indigenous concerns. Over the past thirty years, neoliberalism and its adjunct of democracy promotion have been applied, albeit unevenly and with varying degrees of enthusiasm, resulting in privatization of assets and resources, opening up of trade barriers, legislative reforms to facilitate labor flexibility, and the selective rolling backward and forward of the state in social reproduction. Far from being monolithic, neoliberalism is characterized by variation, hybridity with existing policies, and multiple and contradictory aspects regarding neoliberalizing spaces, subjects, and states (Perreault and Martin 2005). As an agenda for development hope, neoliberalism is premised on the notion of a self-adjusting market in which free market capitalism can "construct some sort of space within which it can function" (Harvey 2000, 176-77) and where the role of the state is ostensibly reduced. Ethnic difference can be interpreted as a block on the free working of the market. In the current neoliberal and geopolitical context, according to one businessman, ethnic mobilization "could jeopardize the exploitation of natural resources-gas, oil, gold ... in territories with a significant indigenous population" (Gonzalez Manrique 2005, 1). For Latin American Indian populations, neoliberalism is directly linked to the nonfunctioning of market economies, and the restructuring of economic rights vis- a-vis nation-states in ways that undercut indigenous security and livelihoods. This is in large part due to the restless spatialization of capital as it negotiates with "the geography of place" (Harvey 2000, 179). The geographies of market capitalism are frequently destructive of local and national forms of economy, just as they "creatively" expand the opportunities for minority wealth creation. Although neoliberal capital compromises with its very spatialization, these apparent flexibilities serve to deepen uneven development as they permit greater exploitation of particular juxtapositions of landscape, people, and resources (Massey 2005). Latin American neoliberalisms work against a politics of redistribution by exacerbating inequality and pushing indigenous people into poverty. Privatization of land markets, combined with the emphasis on individual responsibility, has compounded indigenous loss of voice (e.g., Sanabria 1999). Neoliberalism's support for entrepreneurialism pushes Indians into market-oriented production and restrictive forms of political participation (Radcliffe and Laurie 2006a, 2006b; Andolina, Laurie, and Radcliffe, forthcoming). Large numbers of Indians remain impoverished under neoliberalism, trapped by segregated labor markets, limited product outlets, insecure land tenure, and weak social welfare. The economic story of neoliberalism's failure represents only part of the picture, however; neoliberalism has also entailed the restructuring of the cultural terms of (indigenous) citizenship and the sociopolitical pact through which rights are extended and realized. The neoliberal dismantling of corporatist state systems, which granted Indians some recognition and representation in decisions over rights, has contributed to widespread ethnic protest. Neoliberal restructuring breaks previous forms of rule (1930-1970s) that granted Indians access to resources and political representation (Yashar 1999). This Indian-state pact was broken, reworked, and re- formed during the debt crisis, democratic transitions, and neoliberalism in a contested and tense process (Assies, van der Haar, and Hoekema 2001), such that although civil and political rights are now formally established on paper, social and economic rights are more insecure in practice, and the political and cultural bases for state-indigenous negotiations have been trans- formed. Formal democracy, with regular elections and civilian representatives, now exists, yet slow economic growth, inequalities, and ineffective judiciaries and social services provision combine to undermine citizens' confidence in elective democracies (UNDP 2004). On the one hand administrative decentralization and formal channels of citizen participation deepen democracy, even as macroeconomic decision making remains with technocrat elites, and social welfare comes through unaccountable NGOs (Radcliffe 2001). Policy shifts to multiculturalism entail specific politico-cultural consequences for Indians and shape their political and social rights. Under neoliberal multiculturalism, the new "indigenous slot" offered to ethnic citizens has tended to give limited (and conditional) resources to Indians and to police their expression of identity (Hale 2002; Paley 2002). Multiculturalism represents both "opportunity and peril" for Indians (Hale 2002, 487), the peril resting in its tendency to listen only to certain voices. On these grounds, neoliberal development prompts indigenous groups to mobilize to demand recognition (as racially discriminated groups whose ethnic recognition under corporatism was removed) and redistribution (a voice in macroeconomic and national decision making). Ecuador illustrates the groundedness and contingent nature of interconnections between political economy, political culture, ethnic identity, and institutionalized social difference in neoliberal development. Ecuadorian neoliberalism over twenty years has openly favored economic elites and systematically harmed low-income sectors (Divalos 2004).12 In this context it is not surprising that Ecuador's indigenous campaigns hold governments accountable for overeager endorsement of neoliberalism (Collins 2001; Zamosc 2004) and stand at the forefront of peaceful protest alongside poor urban and rural dwellers, women, and informal workers. For example, they protest the neoliberal Ecuador-U.S. Free Trade Treaty negotiations with "days of struggle" and demands for transparent talks. Indian agendas highlight the need for capitalist development, but question the context of closed decision-making, U.S. geopolitics, and neoliberal models of poverty alleviation. According to CONAIE leader Leonidas Iza, We don't have food to feed our children. Our markets are flooded with cheap imports. Imported milk is dumped on Ecuador for half what it costs to produce, but TNCs sell it back to us at $1.80 a liter. We have no way to live, and the FTAA will only make it worse. When we complain, the US government calls us terrorists. We are not threatening anything but we are hungry and tired and things have to change. -(Quoted in CONAIE 2006) Protest against neoliberalism makes Indians vulnerable to state and extra-state violence, echoing earlier histories of anti-Indian violence. In March 2006, the Ecuadorian president accused Indian movements of destabilizing the country with four days of roadblocks and protests; the government declared a state of emergency in five highland, largely Indian, provinces in an effort to prevent indigenous strategy meetings (BBC News 2006a). Public meetings were banned and a curfew was imposed, troops reinforced security along major roads into the capital (Comercio 2006; Andrade 2006). Despite these actions, CONAIE continued to engage a public debate around the institutional and political terms of free-trade decision making. Why, it asked, did the government make negotiations confidential? Why appoint an export agro-industry representative as Minister of Economy (CONAIE 2006)? In short, Ecuador exemplifies the recent "politicization of ethnic cleavages" (Yashar 1999, 87) by which worsening indigenous disadvantage together with reorganization of decision- making structures generates Indian protest. Neoliberal economic and political restructurings are experienced as threats to Andean ethnic security, with Indians "fear[ing free trade] will damage their livelihoods and their way of life" (Andrade 2006). Yet it is not merely a question of different priorities-an indigenous alternative to a neoliberal agenda. Rather "attempts to establish a neoliberal order can act as factors of political destabilization" (Zamosc 2004, 132). In other words, the seeds of political instability, now of such concern to Washington, lie precisely with the political agendas and consequences embedded in neoliberal macroeconomic development.

#### Unless we challenge the ideology underpinning current engagement towards Latin America, global slaughter becomes inevitable

Robinson 2008 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, “Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective” pg. xii-xiii)

The truth, as Hegel said, is in the whole. That said, if there is any one caveat to highlight here, it is that in a slim volume such as this simplification is unavoidable. I can only shine a spotlight on a select few of the trees that make up the forest and must inevitably omit entirely a look at other trees, no matter how much they may be integral to the forest. In the end, any intellectual endeavor is open-ended: a work in progress. My approach—to look at Latin America as a whole—inevitably understates complexity and divergence and overstates the extent to which general statements can be made. There is no single, homogenous Latin America. Nonetheless, the exercise remains valid—indeed, useful and vital—insofar as there are underlying structural shifts that have produced clear region-wide patterns of change. There is a general pattern across all of Latin America of transition to global capitalism, even if each country and region has experienced this transition on the basis of its own particular constellation of social forces, historical circumstances, and contingent variables. I am concerned in the present study with identifying this underlying unity among varied patterns of change, with extrapolating from divergent experiences to uncover these general patterns and categories of events—such as the spread of nontraditional exports, the rise of transnational capitalists from among the region's dominant groups, the debt crisis and the preponderance of global financial markets, and the upsurge of new resistance movements across the region. These general patterns point to underlying causal processes of capitalist globalization. Returning to the dual themes of crisis and critical globalization studies, there can be little doubt that we are living in troubling times in the "global village." The system of global capitalism that now engulfs the entire planet is in crisis. There is consensus among scientists that we are on the precipice of ecological holocaust, including the mass extinction of species; the impending collapse of agriculture in major producing areas; the meltdown of polar ice caps; the phenomenon of global warming; and the contamination of the oceans, food stock, water supply, and air. Social inequalities have spiraled out of control, and the gap between the global rich and the global poor has never been as acute as it is in the early twenty-first century. While absolute levels of poverty and misery expand around the world under a new global-social apartheid, the richest 20 percent of humanity received in 2000 more than 85 percent of the world's wealth while the remaining 80 percent of humanity had to make do with less than 15 percent of the wealth, according to the United Nation's oft-cited annual Human Development Report (UNDP, 2000). Driven by the imperatives of over accumulation and transnational social control, global elites have increasingly turned to authoritarianism, militarization, and war to sustain the system. Many political economists concur that a global economic collapse is possible, even probable. In times such as these intellectuals are called upon to engage in a critical analytical and theoretical understanding of global society: to contribute to an understanding of history and social change that may elucidate the inner workings of the prevailing order and the causal processes at work in that order that generate crisis. They are also called upon to expose the vested interests bound up with the global social order, the discourses through which those interests are articulated, and the distinct alternatives to the extant order that counterhegemonic agents put forward. Intellectual production is always a collective process. Let us not lose sight of the social and historical character of intellectual labor. All those scholars who engage in such labor or make knowledge claims are organic intellectuals in the sense that studying the world is itself a social act, committed by agents with a definite relationship to the social order. Intellectual labor is social labor; its practitioners are social actors; and the products of its labor are not neutral or disinterested. In recent years I have proposed a rationale and minimal guidelines for critical globalization studies and have called on intellectuals to "exercise a preferential option for the majority in global society" (Robinson, 2006c). Globalization is not a neutral process. It involves winners and losers and new relations of power and domination. We need organic intellectuals capable of theorizing the changes that have taken place in the system of capitalism, in this epoch of globalization, and of providing to popular majorities these theoretical insights as inputs for their real-world struggles to develop alternative social relationships and an alternative social logic—the logic of majorities—to that of the market and of transnational capital. In other words, critical globalization studies has to be capable of inspiring emancipatory action, of bringing together multiple publics in developing programs that integrate theory and practice.

### 1AC—Pedagogy

#### Contention two is pedagogy—

#### Our thoughts and ideas that inform our understanding of Latin America matter – problematizing the way we think about Latin America in academic debate is critical to challenge the current ideology and change political thought about the region

Bertucci, 2013 (Mariano, Political Science and International Relations Ph.D. candidate at the University of Southern California, “Latin America Has Moved On: U.S. Scholarship Hasn’t”, Americas Quarterly, Vol. 7 No. 2, Spring)

The bias in U.S. research on U.S. foreign policy in Latin America not only skews analysis and understanding of the region, it also sidesteps today's greatest challenges. The study of what scholars focus on and debate helps to shape how policy is understood and discussed in the public realm and, sometimes, even made. However, a close look at the past three decades of scholarly publications on U.S.-Latin American relations, covering 174 peer-reviewed articles and 167 non-edited books, reveals a disconnect with many of the themes and realities in the region today. International relations or other fields of inquiry related to global studies, such as international political economy or security, are severely underrepresented in scholarship on the Western Hemisphere. Instead, most of the research in the field is based on the study of foreign policy. Over 94 percent of the scholarly publications noted above that are dedicated to the region could be qualified as foreign policy analyses rather than the more current or trendy themes of international relations theory or international political economy. And within foreign policy studies, it is essentially the study of the U.S. foreign policy-making process. Virtually all (89 percent) scholarly works offering foreign policy analyses of U.S.-Latin American relations make U.S. foreign policy a central focus in their understanding of U.S.-Latin American affairs. Roughly half of the articles and books (51 percent) focus on foreign policy initiatives and reactions of the U.S. and Latin American countries toward one another; and almost 40 percent of published works only analyze U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. As a direct consequence of this approach, there is almost no attention paid to international political economy or security. And that, in turn, has led to a neglect of some of the most central and challenging issues in today's policy agenda: narcotics trafficking, migration, the environment, and energy cooperation. Alongside the U.S.-centic understanding of Latin America, there are relatively few policy articles and books on foreign policies of Caribbean countries, on South American countries-including, most notably, Brazil- and even on Mexico's policies toward the United States. As a result, there are serious gaps in our understanding of how much latitude nation-states in the Americas have to set their own policy, especially in a region in which U.S. influence is becoming more diffuse. Other gaps concern the migration, drug-related, and energy security issues and threats faced by the United States. These problems are likely to be solved only through sustained cooperative efforts with countries such as Mexico and Brazil. But these countries' foreign policies toward the U.S. are under studied. Only 12.9 percent of all articles and books focus on U.S.-Mexico relations and less than 3 percent focus on Mexico's foreign policy toward the United States. Similarly, less than 5 percent of articles and books analyze U.S.-Brazil relations and no more than 2 percent examine Brazil's foreign policy toward the "Colossus of the North." These are critical gaps. Any informed foreign policy must be based on an understanding of both sides. Differences in Understanding The deficiencies-even biases-of current research on U.S.-Latin American relations become even more apparent when peer-reviewed publications of U.S.-based scholars are compared to those of scholars based in Latin America. U.S.- based scholars address the foreign policies of Latin American countries in just 3.1 percent of their publications, but 87 percent of their works put the U.S. at the center of the analysis. Meanwhile, U.S.-Latin American foreign policy interactions are addressed in only one-third of their publications. The implication of this pattern is clear: the literature leaves one with the impression that "U.S.-Latin American relations" is synonymous with "U.S. policy." This distortion in research and the literature can have practical and policy impacts. Most significantly, it has contributed to the conventional wisdom that the best way to make sense of U.S.-Latin American relations is to understand, first and foremost, the U.S. foreign policy- making process. That, however, only delivers truncated pictures of the factors shaping the hemisphere historically and, especially, today. To be sure, policy doesn't automatically follow from scholarly publications. Still, research-based ideas do trickle down through the work of think tanks, op-eds, policy journals, and other venues. Scholars do participate in government-either as consultants or as appointees- and policymakers have been exposed to research at some point in their professional development. Almost three decades of a U.S.-centered perspective on Latin America is likely to shape a very particular worldview on the policy issues at hand. From there, it's a short step to hegemonic conceptions of U.S.-Latin American relations, particularly when combined with the predominance in policy circles of an untested theoretical model in which the U.S. is the actor and Latin American countries the dependent and defenseless objects. Research by scholars based in Latin America appears somewhat more balanced but no less parochial than that of their U.S. colleagues. In their studies of U.S.-Latin American relations, Latin American scholars put their own countries' foreign policies center stage in 71 percent of publications. They address U.S.-Latin American foreign interactions in roughly half of their work, but consider U.S. foreign policy toward the region to be the more salient focus of their analyses in 16 percent of their articles. Similar patterns appear when you compare scholarship in the U.S. to scholarship from Latin America in matters of international political economy. Economic integration and regionalism are only addressed in less than 10 percent of journal publications by U.S.-based scholars; however, these same issues are the focus of almost 40 percent of the journal articles published by Latin American scholars. As a result, integration efforts (e.g. ,the Free Trade Area of the Americas, Mercosur, ftaa- Mercosur interactions, and nafta) that have been front and center in shaping Latin American policy are given short shriftin U.S.-based research and scholarship. The difference-and its implications for how scholars and policymakers on both sides of the Rio Grande view the world and the region-will only become more stark as the trend toward sub-regional integration through institutions like celac and unasur increases. Moreover, where much of the Latin American policy debates since the early 1990s focused on convergence, typical international relations (IR) specialists would have tended to look at individual interests of countries and the trend toward divergence unless there were common interests at stake. Even though developments in migration, energy security and drug-related violence confirm the intermestic nature (i.e., the interplay of international and domestic politics) of the current U.S.-Latin American relationship, research patterns show that the stock of knowledge available to policymakers working on any such issues is marginal. Only 16 percent of articles and books on U.S.-Latin American relations focus on the environment, migration and narcotics. Furthermore, some intermestic issues, such as remittances, energy supply and public health, are almost completely ignored. A similar pattern is evident in relation to exploring the role of non-state actors in U.S.-Latin American relations. Multinational enterprises, religious and guerrilla organizations, among others, have all presumably had a significant impact on hemispheric affairs. Yet only 6 percent of the scholarly work published on U.S.- Latin American relations over the past quarter century has paid attention to such non-state actors, rendering their role in hemispheric affairs a matter of speculation. Moreover, the recent literature almost completely disregards more traditional security issues, such as deterrence of extra-hemispheric powers and risks of nuclear proliferation and war. Getting Over Our Yanqui Foreign Policy Obsession Apart from the regional differences in terms of research perspectives, research patterns in U.S.-Latin American affairs more generally diverge from trends in the broader field of international relations, in which foreign policy analysis is marginal compared to the attention devoted to international political economy, security issues and international relations theory. The differences demonstrate that little intellectual dialogue and sharing is taking place among international relations scholars and U.S.-Latin American relations specialists. Rectifying this situation would require IR scholars to explain, test and, when necessary, develop new theories on the causes and interests surrounding the pressing policy issues in the hemisphere. Many of these issues also lend themselves to quantitative analyses now dominant in IR. Statistical measures can help assess levels, degrees and dimensions of asymmetries between countries on both sides of the Rio Grande. Game theory can specify the terms, conditions and extent of compliance with (or defection from) multilateral schemes. And Bayesian algebra can help identify the conditions promoting cooperation or defection. But all this is easier said than done. As of 2013, the Latin American Studies Association (LASA)-the largest professional association for individuals and institutions studying Latin America-does not have a section on international relations (although, as of 2011, it does offer an award for the best book published on the region's foreign policy and international affairs). Funding opportunities for researching the hemisphere's international politics are relatively scarce, particularly for young IR scholars. Also, the current reputational pecking order in the field of international relations hardly rewards regional expertise. This is particularly true in the U.S. and increasingly so in other countries. Even if some scholars are willing to do some soulsearching of their own and embrace the mindset, tools and research goals of IR in their analyses of U.S.-Latin American relations, such efforts are not likely to be enough to systematically yield more balanced, practical and IR-minded approaches to inter-American affairs. Governments, think tanks, university-based research centers, and foundations throughout the hemisphere also need to be involved by helping to redefine and build new institutional supports for producing research that is both peer-reviewed and policy-relevant. More foundations, think tanks and research grants need to also place a higher priority on producing peerreviewed IR research on the pressing issues in the hemisphere. As the leading professional association, LASA needs to encourage and support the creation of a section on international relations that could bring together the work of both senior and young IR scholars around a U.S.-Latin American relations policy-driven research agenda. Governments should also help fund training and research on those same policy issues in top IR research programs. The creation of a peer-reviewed outlet with the mission of publishing theory-based and methodologically rigorous research on the intermestic dimensions of narcotrafficking, energy security and organized crime, to name just a few hot policy examples, would be an important addition to the relatively limited number of outlets available to publish research on inter-American politics and economics. Only from such platforms can innovative new research contribute sustainably to the shaping of common solutions to the shared problems in the hemisphere.

#### The modern world is inseparable from the colonial origins that gave birth to it – our foundational western logic is soaked with colonialist thought which must be resisted

Mignolo 5(Walter, Professor at Duke University, Joint Appointments in Cultural Anthropology and Romance Studies, “The Idea of Latin America,” pg 5)

How do these two entangled concepts, modernity and coloniality, work together as two sides of the same reality to shape the idea of “America” in the sixteenth century and of “Latin” America in the nineteenth? Modernity has been a term in use for the past thirty or forty years. In spite of differences in opinions and deﬁnitions, there are some basic agreements about its meaning. From the European perspective, modernity refers to a period in world history that has been traced back either to the European Renaissance and the “discovery” of America (this view is common among scholars from the South of Europe, Italy, Spain, and Portugal), or to the European Enlightenment (this view is held by scholars and intel-lectuals and assumed by the media in Anglo-Saxon countries – England, Germany, and Holland – and one Latin country, France). On the other side of the colonial difference, scholars and intellectu-als in the ex-Spanish and ex-Portuguese colonies in South America have been advancing the idea that the achievements of modernity go hand in hand with the violence of coloniality. The difference, to reiterate, **lies in which side of** each local **history is told**. O’Gorman’s “invention of America” theory was a turning point that put on the table a perspective that was absent and not recognized from the existing European and imperial narratives. Let’s agree that O’Gorman made visible a dimension of history that was occluded by the partial “discovery” narratives, and let’s also agree that it is an example of how things may look from the varied experiences of coloniality. America, as a concept, goes hand in hand with that of modernity, and both are the self-representation of imperial projects and global designs that originated in and were implemented by European actors and institutions. The invention of America was one of the nodal points that contributed to create the conditions for imperial European expansion and a lifestyle, in Europe, that served as a model for the achievements of humanity. Thus, the “discovery and conquest of America” is not just one more event in some long and linear historical chain from the creation of the world to the present, leaving behind all those who were not attentive enough to jump onto the bandwagon of modernity. Rather, it was a key turning point in world history: It was the moment in which the demands of modernity as the ﬁnal horizon of salvation began to require the imposition of a speciﬁc set of values that relied on the logic of coloniality for their implementation. The “invention of America” thesis offers, instead, a perspective from coloniality and, in consequence, reveals that the advances of modernity outside of Europe rely on a colonial matrix of power that includes the renaming of the lands appropriated and of the people inhabiting them, insofar as the diverse ethnic groups and civilizations in Tawantinsuyu and Anáhuac, as well as those from Africa, were reduced to “Indians” and “Blacks.” The idea of “America” and of “Latin” America could, of course, be accounted for within the philosophical framework of European modernity, even if that account is offered by Creoles of European descent dwelling in the colonies and embracing the Spanish or Portuguese view of events. What counts, however, is that the need for telling the part of the story that was not told requires a shift in the geography of reason and of understanding. “Coloniality,” therefore, points toward and intends to unveil an embedded logic that enforces control, domina-tion, and exploitation disguised in the language of salvation, progress, modernization, and being good for every one. The double register of modernity/coloniality has, perhaps, never been as clear as it has been recently under the administration of US president George W. Bush. Pedagogically, it is important for my argument to conceptualize “modernity/coloniality” as two sides of the same coin and not as two separate frames of mind: you cannot be modern without being colonial; and if you are on the colonial side of the spectrum you have to transact with modernity – you cannot ignore it. The very idea of America cannot be separated from coloniality: the entire continent emerged as such in the European consciousness as a massive extent of land to be appropriated and of people to be converted to Christianity, and whose labor could be exploited. Coloniality, as a term, is much less frequently heard than “moder-nity” and many people tend to confuse it with “colonialism.” The two words are related, of course. While “colonialism” refers to spe-ciﬁc historical periods and places of imperial domination (e.g., Spanish, Dutch, British, the US since the beginning of the twentieth century), “coloniality” refers to the logical structure of colonial domination underlying the Spanish, Dutch, British, and US control of the Atlantic economy and politics, and from there the control and management of almost the entire planet. In each of the particu-lar imperial periods of colonialism – whether led by Spain (mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) or by England (from the nineteenth century to World War II) or by the US (from the early twentieth century until now) – the same logic was maintained; only power changed hands.

#### The structures of knowledge which we engage as debaters are constituted by this underlying supremacy of modernity – we as debaters must reinscribe the colonial difference in order to pluralize knowledge and evaluate alternate perspectives

Alcoff 7 (Linda, professor of philosophy at Syracuse University, “Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality”, The New Centennial Review, Winter 2007, pp. 79-102)

Modernity” was imagined as the house of epistemology. ¶ —Walter Mignolo (2006, 93)¶ Together with Enrique Dussel, his fellow Argentine exile, and Anibal Quijano, a Peruvian sociologist, Mignolo’s main argument throughout his corpus ¶ has been that modernity emerged from colonialism, not after it nor simply ¶ alongside. Colonialism is constitutive of modernity, of its teleological macronarratives of human progress, and of the material base necessary to provide ¶ both the surplus and the self-representation required to imagine Europe ¶ as the vanguard of the human race. To put this another way, colonialism is ¶ constitutive of both the base and the superstructure of modernity.¶ From Quijano, Mignolo has taken up the idea of a coloniality of power to ¶ refer to the system that organized the distribution of epistemic, moral, and ¶ aesthetic resources in a way that both reflects and reproduces empire (Quijano 1998). Th e concept of coloniality of power allows us to think through ¶ how the colonized were subjected not simply to a rapacious exploitation of ¶ all their resources but also to a hegemony of Eurocentric knowledge systems.¶ It allows us to understand the constitutive relationship between the historical a priori of European thought and its off -shore adventures. It also allows ¶ us to think through the Anglo- and Eurocentric structure of thought and ¶ representation that continues to dominate much of the world today, whether ¶ or not, in a given place and time, formal national liberation has been won.¶ From Dussel, Mignolo took up the idea of transmodernity, which signifies ¶ the global networks within which European modernity itself became possible. ¶ Transmodernity operates to displace the teleological and linear progression ¶ of modernity and postmodernity, rendering even the most anti-Western ¶ postmodernists still complicit with the temporal concepts of colonialism that ¶ erased the colonial diff erence. Whereas the concepts of modernity and postmodernity maintain the Eurocentric imaginary timeline of Greece → Rome ¶ → Renaissance → Modern World, relegating the colonized areas of the world ¶ as peripheral to the main story, the concept of transmodernity is intended ¶ by Dussel to displace that timeline with a spatialization in which the whole ¶ planet is involved at every stage in history. If modernity is imagined to be ¶ European, transmodernity is planetary, with principle players from all parts ¶ of the globe.¶ Both Dussel and Quijano have developed their concepts of transmodernity and of the coloniality of power, respectively, with a strong linkage to ¶ questions of knowledge and questions of reason. Quijano writes that the ¶ concept “coloniality of power” implies “the hegemony of Eurocentrism as ¶ epistemological perspective”(quoted in Mignolo 2000, 54). And for Dussel, ¶ transmodernity must be accompanied by what he calls a “liberating reason” ¶ as an alternative to the imperial, ego-logical reason of cartesian colonial ¶ modernity (see esp. 1995). But even more than these and other theorists of ¶ colonialism, it is Walter Mignolo who has focused on the epistemological ¶ eff ects of colonialism. Since the publication in 1995 of Th e Darker Side of the ¶ Renaissance, Mignolo’s central focus in his subsequent work, including the ¶ collection of essays Local Histories/Global Designs and in several essays that ¶ have appeared in journals and anthologies, has been on the subordination of ¶ non-European modes of knowing, conceptualization, and representation.¶ Hegemony in Mignolo’s usage of the term is very much taken from the ¶ Gramscian idea of hegemony as the construction of mass consent. Th at is,¶ hegemony is achieved through a project of persuasion that works principally ¶ through claims to truth. Europe is ahead because Europe is smarter and ¶ more reflective than the rest of the world; the United States has the right to ¶ hog the world’s resources because it knows best how to make use of them. ¶ Leading liberals like Arthur Schlesinger make the claim for Western epistemic ¶ supremacy without any embarrassment: Schlesinger claims not that Europe ¶ (and the U.S. as a European nation) has made no mistakes, but that Europe ¶ alone invented the scientific method, which gave it the capacity to critique its ¶ mistakes. Moreover, he claims that, although every culture “has done terrible ¶ things,” “whatever the particular crimes of Europe, that continent is also the ¶ source—the unique source—of those liberating ideas . . . to which most of the ¶ world today aspires. These are European ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor ¶ Middle eastern ideas, except by adoption”(Schlesinger 1992, 127; emphasis in ¶ original). The result of the wide acceptance of such hegemonic claims in the ¶ United States and in Europe is a broad-based consent to imperial war as the ¶ presumptive entitlement of the political vanguard of the human race; the ¶ result of the acceptance of such hegemonic claims in the colonized world ¶ includes such symptomatic eff ects as the ones Samuel Ramos and Octavio ¶ Paz described when they said that Mexicans have an alienated relationship ¶ to their own temporal reality, and that they imagine the real present as occurring somewhere else than where they live. Th e temporal displacement ¶ or alienation of space, which causes the colonized person to be unable to ¶ experience their own time as the now and instead to see that “now” as occurring in another space, is the result of a Eurocentric organization of time ¶ in which time is measured by the developments in technological knowledge, ¶ the gadget porn of iPods and BlackBerrys, and the languages in which that ¶ technological knowledge is developed. Who is developing the latest gadgets? ¶ What language do they speak? Th ese questions show us where the “now” ¶ resides, and thus, who is “behind.”¶ In Th e Phenomenology of Spirit (1977), Hegel works through a phenomenology of subjectivity precisely by beginning with the reference points “here” ¶ and “now.” Th ese are terms whose meaning cannot be elucidated without ¶ reference to a specific spatio-temporally located consciousness; we cannot ¶ judge either the justification or the meaning of a claim about “here” or about¶ “now” without knowing its specific context of reference. From these common ¶ indexicals, Hegel meant to show that all knowledge is similarly indexed to a ¶ specific subject, place, and time, in the sense that knowledge is dependent on ¶ justificatory procedures, measuring instruments, theoretical and metaphysical ¶ framing concepts, and categories of analysis that are intelligible within a given ¶ located domain—a fact that should not lead us to skepticism, in his view, but ¶ to see that to understand the world we need first to understand ourselves.¶ Th is explains why it is so important that the relationship between the ¶ colonized subject and its “here” and “now” is displaced by the colonial ¶ imaginary. If the knowing subject is the point of reference around which all ¶ knowledge claims revolve, what happens when that subject has only an indirect and long-distance relationship to its own “here” and “now,” or when it ¶ has what Ramos called an alienated account of its own reality (Ramos 1962)? ¶ Th e result is that it can no longer serve as the reference point for knowledge, ¶ or judge the adequacy of claims of justification. It no longer knows.¶ For Ramos, Paz, Zea, Edouard Glissant, and the many others in this ¶ tradition who identified colonial alienation of consciousness, the solution ¶ to alienation is a positional shift to “our America” in which a philosophy ¶ reflective of its own Latin American reality might be developed. In his most ¶ recent work, Th e Idea of Latin America (2005), Mignolo expresses doubts ¶ about this alternative Latin America construction, predicated as it is on another exclusionary paradigm. Before we can go about the process of developing a new philosophy and new account of “our” reality, he argues, we need ¶ a more extensive period of epistemological reflection. We need to develop ¶ a decolonial critical theory that will be more thoroughly delinked from the ¶ contemporary variants of the modern imperial designs of the recent past.¶ Th e fact that language, space, time, and history have all been colonized ¶ through the colonization of knowledge must give us pause before we borrow the founding concepts of Eurocentric thought, such as center/periphery, ¶ tradition/modernity, and primitive/civilized, or the very evaluative binary ¶ structure that grounds these. Mignolo develops Quijano’s concept of the coloniality of power, then, as a way to name that set of framing and organizing assumptions that justify hierarchies and make it almost impossible to evaluate ¶ alternative claims. Why was it said that there were no pre-Colombian books¶ or forms of writing, when it was known that the codices had been raided and ¶ burned in heaps? How could the claim that modernity represented an expansion of freedom not be challenged by its development within the context of ¶ colonialism? Why do we continue to conceptualize rationality as separate ¶ from and properly in dominion over the realm of aff ect, a distinctly Greek ¶ and nonindigenous notion, as Mariategui showed many decades ago? Why ¶ is it considered sufficient, even exemplary, to have one Latin Americanist in ¶ a university history department in the United States, when 5 or 10 or even 15 ¶ Europeanists are required? And in philosophy departments, it is not necessary to have a single one.¶ To think through and beyond these persistent limitations in Western ¶ knowledge practices, Mignolo argues that we need to reinscribe what he calls ¶ the “colonial diff erence” into the order of representation. If the Eurocentric ¶ imaginary of modernity has forgotten colonialism and relegated the colonized spaces to the periphery and to the past in its description of universal ¶ reality (even if that “past” paradoxically exists in the “present”), the task of ¶ the colonial diff erence is to reinscribe simultaneity. To make “our America” ¶ no longer considered peripheral and behind the “now,” hierarchical and binary categories must be replaced with pluralist and egalitarian ones.¶ Mignolo’s concept of the colonial diff erence is thus an attempt to reveal ¶ and displace the logic of the same by which Europeans have represented their ¶ others. Non-Europeans are seen as existing on the same historical trajectory, ¶ but further behind; their goals are the same, but not achieved to the same ¶ degree; their knowledge is subject to the same justificatory procedures, but ¶ it is less well-developed. In this way, true otherness or diff erence is invisible ¶ and unintelligible. By use of the term “colonial diff erence,” Mignolo seeks to ¶ break out of this logic of the same. He seeks both to reveal the way in which ¶ power has been at work in creating that diff erence (that is, the way in which ¶ colonialism creates “backwardness” both materially and ideologically) as ¶ well as the way in which colonial power represents and evaluates diff erence. ¶ The coloniality of power, in other words, produces, evaluates, and manages ¶ the colonial difference.¶ Now here let me signal one of the issues of critical debate I want to raise ¶ later on in the paper: What is the nature of the diff erence that Mignolo¶ means to signify by the term “colonial diff erence”? Is it an absolute or a relative diff erence; that is, does it stand alone or is it dependent on its relation to ¶ Eurocentrism? Is it, like the concept of race, an epiphenomena of colonialism ¶ itself, or does it preexist the colonial encounter in the way that Dussel suggests that “living labor” preexists capitalism? What, in other words, is the ¶ metaphysical status of the colonial diff erence?¶ I will return to this question, but here let me conclude this summary ¶ exposition of Mignolo’s critique of Western epistemology before turning to ¶ his more constructive rebuilding of knowledge. First, we need to understand ¶ where Mignolo’s critique of Western epistemology fits within the internal ¶ debates within Western philosophy itself, in which binary concepts and ¶ absolutist accounts of knowledge have come under so much criticism since ¶ the turn away from positivism (a trend that has occurred in both the analytic ¶ and continental traditions). One good way to illuminate his relationship to ¶ this internal Western critique is to look at Mignolo’s changed relationship to ¶ the tradition of hermeneutics.¶ Within the debates of Western epistemology, hermeneutics, as the ¶ science of interpretation that focuses on understanding rather than mere ¶ propositional knowledge, is often portrayed as the other of epistemology, ¶ its more expansive sibling, or its gentler, kinder face. Because hermeneutics ¶ recognizes the interpretive step involved in all understanding, thus making ¶ it possible to pluralize meaning, many see hermeneutics as less prone to ¶ imperialism than epistemology proper. For epistemology in the Cartesian ¶ tradition, to note the role of the situation of the knower is to submit to ¶ relativism, and to acknowledge the ubiquity of interpretive frames would ¶ be to invite skepticism. Knowledge is either imperial or it does not exist. For ¶ hermeneutics, by contrast, the situated-ness of knowers, what Gadamer calls ¶ “prejudgement” and Heidegger calls “foreknowledge,” that works to situate ¶ both knower and known in time and space, is a precondition of knowledge ¶ and not the sign of its demise. Just as Hegel showed that “here” and “now” ¶ cannot be elucidated outside of a context, so hermeneutics argues that ¶ knowledge is not intelligible outside of a tradition.¶ Much of Mignolo’s critique of epistemology concerns its inability to acknowledge its location, the undeniable fact of its local history. Epistemology’s¶ hegemonic eff ects are tied to its denial of its own spatial locality. Western ¶ epistemology systematically delocalized knowledge, Mignolo argues (2000b, ¶ 22, 41). So one might reasonably wonder why Mignolo rejects hermeneutics ¶ as vigorously as he rejects epistemology, given hermeneutic’s acknowledgement of the local foundation of all truth.¶ The reason is because Mignolo sees hermeneutics (at least in his more recent work) as the corollary of epistemology, not its true other. Epistemology’s ¶ proper focus is scientific knowledge; hermeneutics’ proper focus is meaning ¶ and understanding. Both domains, however, are represented without the ¶ colonial diff erence. The question of what is meaningful or intelligible, in ¶ other words, is no less subject to colonial representations than the question ¶ of what is true (9). Both are judged within a European frame of reference. ¶ At one point Mignolo was adopting the phrase “pluritopic hermeneutics,” ¶ following Raimundo Panikkar, to signify the way in which a hermeneutic ¶ approach might be cured of its Eurocentrism and provide a real alternative to monological and imperial unified standards of reference. Pluritopic ¶ hermeneutics, as opposed to the usual monotopic hermeneutics one finds in ¶ Gadamer, Heidegger, and the European tradition generally, does not assume ¶ there exists one single unified historical culture with which new meanings ¶ must be “fused,” to use Gadamer’s term. Rather, pluritopic hermeneutics ¶ assumes no central frame or unified tradition at all and thus opens up the ¶ determination of meaning to multiple possibilities even within the same ¶ historical horizon.

#### Vote aff to affirm economic engagement with Latin America through the lens of epistemic disobedience – this delinking from Western thought breaks the illusion of progressive modernity and portrays the reality of our colonial domination – this is the ONLY effective and ethical affirmation of the resolution

Mignolo 12 (Walter, Professor at Duke University, Joint Appointments in Cultural Anthropology and Romance Studies, “Epistemic Disobedience and the Decolonial Option: A Manifesto,” Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 45-46)

But the basic formulation of decolonial delinking (e.g., desprendimiento) was advanced by Aníbal Quijano in his ground-breaking article “Colonialidad y modernidad/racionalidad” (1991) [Coloniality and modernity/rationality]. The argument was that, on the one hand, an analytic of the limits of Eurocentrism (as a hegemonic structure of knowledge and beliefs) is needed. But that analytic was considered necessary rather than sufficient. It was necessary, Quijano asserted, “desprenderse de las vinculaciones de la racionalidad-modernidad con la colonialidad, en primer término, y en definitiva con todo poder no constituido en la decisión libre de gentes libres” [“It is necessary to extricate oneself from the linkages between rationality/modernity and coloniality, first of all, and definitely from all power which is not constituted by free decisions made by free people”].4 “Desprenderse” means epistemic de-linking or, in other words, epistemic disobedience. Epistemic disobedience leads us to decolonial options as a set of projects that have in common the effects experienced by all the inhabitants of the globe that were at the receiving end of global designs to colonize the economy (appropriation of land and natural resources), authority (management by the Monarch, the State, or the Church), and police and military enforcement (coloniality of power), to colonize knowledges (languages, categories of thoughts, belief systems, etc.) and beings (subjectivity). “Delinking” is then necessary because there is no way out of the coloniality of power from within Western (Greek and Latin) categories of thought. Consequently, de-linking implies epistemic disobedience rather than the constant search for “newness” (e.g., as if Michel Foucault’s concept of racism and power were “better” or more “appropriate” because they are “newer”—that is, post-modern—within the chronological history or archaeology of European ideas). Epistemic disobedience takes us to a different place, to a different “beginning” (not in Greece, but in the responses to the “conquest and colonization” of America and the massive trade of enslaved Africans), to spatial sites of struggles and building rather than to a new temporality within the same space (from Greece, to Rome, to Paris, to London, to Washington DC). I will explore the opening up of these spaces—the spatial paradigmatic breaks of epistemic disobedience—in Waman Puma de Ayala and Ottabah Cugoano. The basic argument (almost a syllogism) that I will develop here is the following: if coloniality is constitutive of modernity since the salvationist rhetoric of modernity presupposes the oppressive and condemnatory logic of coloniality (from there come the damnés of Fanon), then this oppressive logic produces an energy of discontent, of distrust, of release within those who react against imperial violence. This energy is translated into decolonial projects that, as a last resort, are also constitutive of modernity. Modernity is a three-headed hydra, even though it only reveals one head: the rhetoric of salvation and progress. Coloniality, one of whose facets is poverty and the propagation of AIDS in Africa, does not appear in the rhetoric of modernity as its necessary counterpart, but rather as something that emanates from it. For example, the Millennium Plan of the United Nations headed by Kofi Anan, and the Earth Institute at Columbia University headed by Jeffrey Sachs, work in collaboration to end poverty (as the title of Sach’s book announces).5 But, while they question the unfortunate consequences of modernity, never for a moment is the ideology of modernity or the black pits that hide its rhetoric ever questioned: the consequences of the very nature of the capitalist economy—by which such ideology is supported—in its various facets since the mercantilism of the sixteenth century, free trade of the following centuries, the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century, and the technological revolution of the twentieth century. On the other hand, despite all the debate in the media about the war against terrorism, on one side, and all types of uprisings, of protests and social movements, it is never suggested that the logic of coloniality that hides beneath the rhetoric of modernity necessarily generates the irreducible energy of humiliated, vilified, forgotten, or marginalized human beings. Decoloniality is therefore the energy that does not allow the operation of the logic of coloniality nor believes the fairy tales of the rhetoric of modernity. Therefore, decoloniality has a varied range of manifestations—some undesirable, such as those that Washington today describes as “terrorists”—and decolonial thinking is, then, thinking that de-links and opens (de-linking and opening in the title come from here) to the possibilities hidden (colonized and discredited, such as the traditional, barbarian, primitive, mystic, etc.) by the modern rationality that is mounted and enclosed by categories of Greek, Latin, and the six modern imperial European languages.

#### Our positioning as students is key---acts of resistance in pedagogical spaces like debate are crucial

Giroux 11 (Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, 21 November 2011, “Occupy Colleges Now: Students as the New Public Intellectuals”, <http://www.truth-out.org/occupy-colleges-now-students-new-public-intellectuals/1321891418>)

Finding our way to a more humane future demands a new politics, a new set of values, and a renewed sense of the fragile nature of democracy. In part, this means educating a new generation of intellectuals who not only defend higher education as a democratic public sphere, but also frame their own agency as intellectuals willing to connect their research, teaching, knowledge, and service with broader democratic concerns over equality, justice, and an alternative vision of what the university might be and what society could become. Under the present circumstances, it is time to remind ourselves that academe may be one of the few public spheres available that can provide the educational conditions for students, faculty, administrators, and community members to embrace pedagogy as a space of dialogue and unmitigated questioning, imagine different futures, become border-crossers, and embrace a language of critique and possibility that makes visible the urgency of a politics necessary to address important social issues and contribute to the quality of public life and the common good. As people move or are pushed by authorities out of their makeshift tent cities in Zuccotti Park and other public spaces in cities across the United States, the harsh registers and interests of the punishing state become more visible. The corporate state cannot fight any longer with ideas because their visions, ideologies and survival of the fittest ethic are bankrupt, fast losing any semblance of legitimacy. Students all over the country are changing the language of politics while reclaiming pedagogy as central to any viable notion of agency, resistance and collective struggle. In short, they have become the new public intellectuals, using their bodies, social media, new digital technologies, and any other viable educational tool to raise new questions, point to new possibilities, and register their criticisms of the various antidemocratic elements of casino capitalism and the emerging punishing state. Increasingly, the Occupy Wall Street protesters are occupying colleges and universities, setting up tents, and using the power of ideas to engage other students, faculty, and anyone else who will listen to them. The call is going out from the University of California at Berkeley, Harvard University, Florida State University, Duke University, Rhode Island College, and over 120 other universities that the time has come to connect knowledge not just to power, but to the very meaning of what it means to be an engaged intellectual responsive to the possibilities of individual and collective resistance and change. This poses a new challenge not only for the brave students mobilizing these protests on college campuses, but also to faculty who often relegate themselves to the secure and comfortable claim that scholarship should be disinterested, objective and removed from politics. There is a great deal these students and young people can learn from this turn away from the so-called professionalism of disinterested knowledge and the disinterested intellectual by reading the works of Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, Jacques Derrida, Howard Zinn, Arundhati Roy, Elaine Scarry, Pierre Bourdieu and others who offer a treasure trove of theoretical and political insights about what it means to assume the role of a public intellectual as both a matter of social responsibility and political urgency. In response to the political indifference and moral coma that embraced many universities and scholars since the 1980s, the late Said argued for intellectuals to move beyond the narrow interests of professionalism and specialization as well as the cheap seductions of celebrity culture being offered to a new breed of publicity and anti-public intellectuals. Said wanted to defend the necessity indeed, keep open the possibility of the intellectual who does not consolidate power, but questions it, connects his or her work to the alleviation of human suffering, enters the public sphere in order to deflate the claims of triumphalism and recalls from exile those dangerous memories that are often repressed or ignored. Of course, such a position is at odds with those intellectuals who have retreated into arcane discourses that offer the cloistered protection of the professional recluse. Making few connections with audiences outside of the academy or to the myriad issues that bear down on everyday lives, many academics became increasingly irrelevant, while humanistic inquiry suffers the aftershocks of flagging public support. The Occupy Wall Street protesters have refused this notion of the deracinated, if not increasingly irrelevant, notion of academics and students as disinterested intellectuals. They are not alone. Refusing the rewards of apolitical professionalism or obscure specialization so rampant on university campuses, Roy has pointed out that intellectuals need to ask themselves some very "uncomfortable questions about our values and traditions, our vision for the future, our responsibilities as citizens, the legitimacy of our 'democratic institutions,' the role of the state, the police, the army, the judiciary, and the intellectual community."[1] Similarly, Scarry points to the difficulty of seeing an injury and injustice, the sense of futility of one's own small efforts, and the special difficulty of lifting complex ideas into the public sphere.[2] Derrida has raised important questions about the relationship between critique and the very nature of the university and the humanities, as when he writes: The university without condition does not, in fact, exist, as we know only too well. Nevertheless, in principle and in conformity with its declared vocation, its professed essence, it should remain an ultimate place of critical resistance and more than critical to all the power of dogmatic and unjust appropriation.[3] Chomsky and the late Zinn have spoken about and demonstrated for over 40 years what it means to think rigorously and act courageously in the face of human suffering and manufactured hardships. All of these theorists are concerned with what it means for intellectuals both within and outside of higher education to embrace the university as a productive site of dialogue and contestation, to imagine it as a site that offers students the promise of a democracy to come, to help them understand that there is no genuine democracy without genuine opposing critical power and the social movements that can make it happen. But there is more at stake here than arguing for a more engaged public role for academics and students, for demanding the urgent need to reconnect humanistic inquiry to important social issues, or for insisting on the necessity for academics to reclaim a notion of ethical advocacy and connective relationships. There is also the challenge of connecting the university with visions that have some hold on the present, defending education as more than an investment opportunity or job credential, students as more than customers, and faculty as more than technicians or a subaltern army of casualized labor. At a time when higher education is increasingly being dominated by a reductive corporate logic and technocratic rationality unable to differentiate training from a critical education, we need a chorus of new voices to emphasize that the humanities, in particular, and the university, in general, should play a central role in keeping critical thought alive while fighting back all attempts to foreclose and pre-empt the further unraveling of human possibilities, prodding human society to go on questioning itself and prevent that questioning from ever stalling or being declared finished. Corporations and the warfare state should not dictate the needs of public and higher education, or, for that matter, any other democratic public sphere. As the Occupy student protesters have pointed out over the last few months, one of the great dangers facing the 21st century is not the risk of illusory hopes, but those undemocratic forces that promote and protect state terrorism, massive inequality, render some populations utterly disposable, imagine the future only in terms of immediate financial gains, and promote forms of self-serving historical reinvention in which power is measured by the degree to which it evades any sense of actual truth and moral responsibility. Students, like their youthful counterparts in the 1960s, are once again arguing that higher education, even in its imperfect state, still holds the promise, if not the reality, of being able to offer them the complex knowledge and interdisciplinary related skills that enable existing and future generations to break the continuity of common sense, come to terms with their own power as critical agents, be critical of the authority that speaks to them, translate private considerations into public issues, and assume the responsibility of not only being governed but learning how to govern. Inhabiting the role of public intellectuals, students can take on the difficult but urgent task of reclaiming the ideal and the practice of what it means to reclaim higher education in general and the humanities, more specifically, as a site of possibility that embraces the idea of democracy not merely as a mode of governance but, most importantlyas journalist Bill Moyers points out as a means of dignifying people so they can become fully free to claim their moral and political agency. Students are starting to recognize that it is crucial to struggle for the university as a democratic public sphere and the need to use that sphere to educate a generation of new students, faculty and others about the history of race, racism, politics, identity, power, the state and the struggle for justice. They are increasingly willing to argue in theoretically insightful and profound ways about what it means to defend the university as a site that opens up and sustains public connections through which people's fragmented, uncertain, incomplete narratives of agency are valued, preserved, and made available for exchange while being related analytically to wider contexts of politics and power. They are moving to reclaim, once again, the humanities as a sphere that is crucial for grounding ethics, justice and morality across existing disciplinary terrains, while raising both a sense of urgency and a set of relevant questions about what kind of education would be suited to the 21st-century university and its global arrangements as part of a larger project of addressing the most urgent issues that face the social and political world. The punishing state can use violence with impunity to eject young people from parks and other public sites, but it is far more difficult to eject them from sites that are designed for their intellectual growth and well-being, make a claim to educate them, and register society's investment and commitment to their future. The police violence that has taken place at the University of California campuses at Berkeley and Davis does more than border on pure thuggery; it also reveals a display of force that is as unnecessary as it is brutal, and it is impossible to justify. These young people are being beaten on their campuses for simply displaying the courage to protest a system that has robbed them of both a quality education and a viable future. But there is more. It is also crucial not to allow casino capitalism to transform higher education into another extension of the corporate and warfare state. If higher education loses its civic purpose and becomes simply an adjunct of corporate and military power, there will be practically no spaces left for dissent, dialogue, civic courage, and a spirit of thoughtfulness and critical engagement. This is all the more reason to occupy colleges and use them as a launching pad to both educate and to expand the very meaning of the public sphere. Knowledge is about more than the truth; it is also a weapon of change. The language of a radical politics needs more than hope and outrage; it needs institutional spaces to produce ideas, values, and social relations capable of fighting off those ideological and material forces of casino capitalism that are intent in sabotaging any viable notion of human interaction, community, solidarity, friendship, and justice. Space is not the ultimate prize here.[4] Politics and ideology are the essence of what this movement should be about. But space becomes invaluable when it its democratic functions and uses are restored. In an age when the media have become a means of mass distraction and entertainment, the university offers a site of informed engagement, a place where theory and action inform each other, and a space that refuses to divorce intellectual activities from matters of politics, social responsibility and social justice. As students and faculty increasingly use the space of the university as a megaphone for a new kind of critical education and politics, it will hopefully reclaim the democratic function of higher education and demonstrate what it means for students, faculty, and others to assume the role of public intellectuals dedicated to creating a formative culture that can provide citizens and others with the knowledge and skills necessary for a radical democracy. Rather than reducing learning to a measurable quantity in the service of a narrow instrumental rationality, learning can take on a new role, becoming central to developing and expanding the capacity for critical modes of agency, new forms of solidarity, and an education in the service of the public good, an expanded imagination, democratic values, and social change. The student intellectual as a public figure merges rigor with civic courage, meaning with the struggle for eliminating injustice wherever it occurs and hope with a realistic notion of social change.

#### You have an ethical obligation as an educator to endorse our injection of Latin American critical theory into debate

Valdes, 2001 (Francisco, Professor of Law at the University of Miami, Co-Director of the Center for Hispanic and Caribbean Legal Studies, B.A. from UC Berkeley, La Raza Law Journal, 12 La Raza L.J. 137, “Insisting on Critical Theory in Legal Education: Making Do While Making Waves”, lexis)

Given the sociolegal landscape of these times, this entrenched status quo is not likely to change substantially anytime soon, at least not without great and sustained struggle. This struggle will require students to insist on critical theory in legal education, and to do so over and over again so that incremental progress is achieved, and then sticks. It will require that law school applicants ask recruiters about the inclusion and integration of critical theory in the curriculum, and to make it plain that final enrollment decisions can be affected, for the better or worse, by the school's response to this question. This struggle also will require individual faculty members and administrators to support student requests and demands, and also to intervene proactively and strategically within the institution whenever possible, to expand opportunities for critical theory in various aspects of formal legal education. Clearly, this struggle is ongoing. In the meantime, faculty and administrators can and must, at a minimum, increase the use of seminar offerings and settings, as well as similarly discretionary opportunities for curricular action, to expand access to critical theory for today's students in these virtually unilateral and relatively expeditious ways. And students should, at a minimum, enroll in these courses and talk them up to new students, supporting these marginal efforts in every possible way, both as students and as alumni. Which, of course, takes us back to the present status quo: the ghetto - the place from which we make waves while making do. Of course, this ghetto of boutique seminars, projects, and centers that exists today is a wonderful and lively place. You should take advantage of these offerings and celebrate this progress, including right here, with the Center for Social Justice and the many activities that it offers to you. It is this ghetto, precisely, that allows us to make do while making waves - and while insisting on a real integration of critical theory in legal education. To make headway, however, it seems to me that we also must create a demand - a "market' demand, if you will - for this kind of basic curricular reform as a substantive way to diversify American legal education and as a way to enhance its value to those of us who remain committed to the example and the legacy of Judge Olmos. If we instead are dismissive or fearful of theory, or indifferent to it in this context of institutional hostility, then we simply are acquiescing to an oppressive status quo that deprives us of a tool that we very much need to help foster and guide social change.

#### The procedural “bracketing out” of our Affirmative is a strategy to maintain the status-quo

Meszaros, 1989 (Istvan, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, The Power of Ideology, p. 232-234)

**Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality** – the self-proclaimed Wertfeihert or value neutrality of so-called ‘rigorous social science’ – **stronger than in the field of methodology.** Indeed, **we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated methodological framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are systematically excluded** (**or** suitably **‘bracketed out’**) **by the scientifically adequate method itself**, **thereby** saving one from unnecessary complication and **securing the desired objectivity and uncontestable outcome**. **Claims and procedures of this kind are**, of course, **extremely problematical**. For **they** **circularly assume that their enthusiasm for** the virtues of ‘methodological **neutrality’ is bound to yield ‘value neutral’ solutions with regard to highly contested issues, without first examining the all-important question as to the conditions of possibility** – or otherwise – of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plane of methodology itself. The unchallengeable validity of the recommended procedure is supposed to be self-evident on account of its purely methodological character. In reality, of course, **this approach to methodology is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance. Since, however, the plane of methodology** (and ‘meta-theory’) **is said to be in principle separated from that of the substantive issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed.** Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the criteria laid down is supposed to establish the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of ‘rational discourse’. Yet, curiously enough, **the proposed methodological tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are a priori excluded from this rational discourse as ‘metaphysical’, ‘ideological’, etc.** **The effect of circumscribing in this way the scope of the one and only admissible approach is that it automatically disqualifies, in the name of methodology itself, all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse**. As a result, the propounders of the ‘right method’ are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities as they necessarily arise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and the rival sets of values associated with them. This is where we can see more clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure. For – **far from offering an adequate scope for critical enquiry – the advocated general adoption of the allegedly neutral methodological framework is equivalent**, in fact, **to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter**. Instead, **the stipulated** ‘common’ methodological **procedure succeeds in transforming the enterprise of ‘rational discourse’ into the dubious practice of producing methodology for the sake of methodology**: a tendency more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point a new knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for its own sake continues to be pursued. And **that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose.** 6.1.2 Naturally, to speak of a ‘common’ methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society torn by irreconcilable social interest and ensuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best, notwithstanding all talk about ‘ideal communication communities’. But **to define the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of transubstantiating into ‘ideal types’** (**or by putting into methodological ‘brackets’**) **the discussion of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality**. For such treatment of the major areas of conflict, under a great variety of forms – from the Viennes version of ‘logical positivism’ to Wittgenstein’s famous ladder that must be ‘thrown away’ at the point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the Popperian principle of ‘little by little’ to the ‘emotivist’ theory of value – inevitably always favours the established order. And **it does so by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the given society ‘out of bounds’ to the potential contestants, on the authority of the ideally ‘common’ methodology**. However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake it ought to be fairly obvious that to consent not to question the fundamental structural framework of the established order is radically different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of that order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail) of that order. Consequently, to establish the ‘common’ identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded hierarchical order – by means of the reduction of the people who belong to the contending social forces into fictitious ‘rational interlocutors’, extracted from their divided real world and transplanted into a beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse – would be nothing short of a methodological miracle. Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational communality, the **elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given order of society in substantive terms**. **This would imply the articulation of the relevant problems** not on the plan of self-referential theory and methodology, but **as inherently practical issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes.** In other words, it would require the explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and meta-theoretical neutrality. But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of ‘fact and value’, ‘theory and practice’, ‘formal and substantive rationality’, etc., the conflict-transcending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of ‘rational discourse’ in the humanities and social sciences, in the interest of the ruling ideology. **What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its value-commitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to bring them into the focus of the discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole**. For the conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and semantic/analytical terms. And who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable – methodologically sanctioned – credentials of ‘procedural rules’, ‘models’ and ‘paradigms’? **Once**, though, **such rules and paradigms are adopted as the common frame of reference of what may or may not be allowed to be considered the legitimate subject of debate, everything that enters into the accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the inexplicit ideological assumptions on the basis of which the methodological principles themselves were in the first place constituted.** This is why the allegedly ‘non-ideological’ ideologies which so successfully conceal and exercise their apologetic function in the guise of neutral methodology are doubly mystifying. Twentieth-century currents of thought are dominated by approaches that tend to articulate the social interests and values of the ruling order through complicated – at time completely bewildering – mediations, on the methodological plane. Thus, more than ever before, the task of ideological demystification is inseparable from the investigation of the complex dialectical interrelationship between methods and values which no social theory or philosophy can escape.

# 2AC

## Fem K

#### Aff is the only way to solve

Boff ’13 (Leonardo Boff- a theologian and writer, known for his active support for the rights of the poor and excluded. He currently serves as Professor Emeritus of Ethics, Philosophy of Religion and Ecology at the Rio de Janeiro State University; “Ecological Constitutionalism in Latin America”; May 18, 2013; http://revolucionalimentaria.wordpress.com/2013/05/18/ecological-constitutionalism-in-latin-america/)

The failure to consider that each being has intrinsic value, independent of its human use, its rational use, and that it is the bearer of the right to exist within the same common habitat, the planet Earth, has opened the path for nature to be treated as a mere object, to be exploited with no other consideration, in some cases, to the point of exhaustion. However, it fell to Latin America, as Eugenio Raul Zaffaroni, noted criminal lawyer and Justice of the Supreme Court of Argentina, shows in, Pachamama and the Human, (La Pachamama y el Humano, Ediciones Colihue 2012), to develop a constitutional theory of an ecological nature, where the Earth and all natural beings, particularly the animals and other living beings are endowed with rights. They must be included in the modern Constitutions that have put aside the deeply rooted anthropocentrism and the dominus paradigm of the human being as lord and dominant master of nature and of the Earth.  The new Latin American constitutionalists unite two currents: one, the more ancestral, is that of the original Nations, for whom the Earth (Pacha) is mother (Mama), hence the name, Pachamama, and is entitled to rights because she is alive and gives us all that we need, and, in the end, because we are part of and belong to her, in the same way as the animals, woods, jungles, waters, mountains and landscape. They all deserve to exist and to coexist with us, forming the great community and cosmic democracy.  They integrate this ancestral, efficacious, tradition of the Andean culture, that stretches from Patagonia to Central America, with the new understanding, derived from contemporary cosmology, genetic and molecular biology, and systems theory, that understands the Earth as a living super-organism that self regulates, (Maturana-Varela and Capra’s autopoiesis), seeking always to maintain life and the capacity to reproduce and to make it co-evolve. This Earth, called Gaia, consists of all beings, and generates and sustains the fabric of life in its vast bio-diversity. The Earth, as a generous Mother, must be respected, recognizing her potentialities and her limits, and therefore, accepted as a bearer of rights, -the dignitas Terrae- the basis for making possible and sustaining all the other personal and social rights.

#### **Only root cause claims come from their fem authors – turns the K**

Morson 7 (Gary, Professor of Slavic Studies, Russian Literature and History at Northwestern, “Anna Karenina In Our Time: Seeing More Wisely,” P. 152-4)

If Levin resembled so may intellectuals in his time and ours, he might seek “root cause” (as we would call it today) of all these failures. Much as the generals an historians satirized in War and Peace mistakenly seek the cause of historical events in a single decision, an much as revolutionaries often reduce the complexities of social ills to a single conspiracy or institution, so intellectuals often view complexity as a delusion to be explained away by a few simple underlying laws. It is just this habit of thought that feeds utopianism, because if the diversity of evil an misery had a single cause, then one could eliminate it by changing only one thing What could be easier? Abolish private property, alter the way children are educated, pass laws to regulate morals according to a given code, and evil will disappear or, at least, radically diminish. Behold, I make all new things But Levin learns that there is no single cause for what has gone wrong. Looking back on the twentieth century, we may wonder whether the root cause of the worst human misery is the belief that there is a root cause of human misery. In fact, many things happen contingently, just “for some reason.”

Friction

When l.evin attends the elections, he tries to handle some business for his sister, but discovers that somehow it cannot be done. In Dostoevsky, the reason would be "administrative ecstasy," the sheer delight bureaucrats take in making petitioners cringe, plead, or wait. But nothing of the sort happens here, and the problem is not one of intent at all. No one has any interest in thwarting Levin, so he cannot understand what goes wrong.

When conspiracy theorists find they cannot accomplish something as easily as expected, they typically ask cut bono? (who benefits?) ro discover the obstacle. Some person or group must have caused the failure. Defeat means sabotage. This way of thinking presumes that behind every action there must be an intent,

whether conscious or unconscious. Such a view rules out the possibility that mere contingency or friction accounts for the difficulty.

flic military theorist Carl von Clauscwitz deemed friction, in this special metaphorical sense, an essential concept in understanding armies. Without using this word, Tolstoy regarded the same phenomenon as pertaining not just to war but to everything social. "If one has never personally experienced war," Clauscwitz explains,

one cannot understand in what difficulties constantly mentioned really consist. . . . Everything looks simple; the knowledge required docs not look remarkable, the strategic options are so obvious that by comparison the simplest problem of higher mathematics has an impressive scientific dignity. Once war has actually been seen the difficulties become clear; but it is extremely difficult to describe the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective. Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. 'Die difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. (Clausewitz, 119)

The unseen, all-pervading element: For Tolstoy, similar difficulties arise when dealing with bureaucracy, introducing changes in agriculture, and implementing reforms. A Tolstoyan perspective is easily imagined today. Social problems look so simple: people in underdeveloped countries are poor, so give their governments foreign aid; workers arc unemployed, so hire them to perform needed government services; schools do not educate, so raise teachers' salaries; the state regulatory commission keeps energy prices too high, so partially privatize the system: answers seem so obvious, but in practice reforms rarely have the intended effect. They produce unintended consequences, which themselves have consequences; and, as Isaiah Berlin liked to point our, no one can foresee the consequences of consequences of consequences. Experience may teach one to expect certain kinds of difficulties, but some can never be anticipated, lhcrc is always friction: "Countless minor incidents —the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal" (Clauscwitz, 119).

No one is deliberately impeding Levin's efforts for his sister. By the same token, no one is trying to thwart his agricultural reforms. Sabotage is out of the question. "All this happened not because anyone felt ill will toward Levin or his farm; on the contrary, he knew that they [rhe peasants] liked him [and] thought him a simple gentleman (their highest praise)" (340).

Friction defeats the reforms. But where does this friction come from and how might one best deal with it?

TTic Elemental Force

'Ihe bailiff and peasants recognize in advance when a plan is bound to fail, and at lasr l.evin, instead of growing angry, pays artention to what they say:

The bailiff listened attentively, and obviously made an effort to approve of his employer's projects. But still he had that look Levin knew so well that always irritated him, a look of hopelessness and despondency. That look said: " Ihat's all very well, but as God wills." Nothing mortified Levin so much as that tone. But it was common to all the bailiffs he had ever had. They had all taken up that attitude toward his plans, and so now he was not angered by it but mortified, and felr all the more roused ro struggle against this, as it seemed, elemental force continually ranged against him, for which he could find no other expression than "as God wills." (165)

Ihe elementalforce: this concept is central to both Tolstoy's great novels. Tolstoy uses a few similar terms for it. In War and Peace, he refers to an elemental force shaping individual lives (W&P, 648) and to "the elemental life of the swarm" constituting the cumulative effect of countless people's small actions governed by no overarching law. In Anna Karentna, he calls the elemental force a "brutal force" when its outcome is cruel. Ihe rough equivalent of friction for Clause-witz, the elemental force applies more widely.

Clauscwitz's explanation stops at friction, but Tolstoy takes the elemental force as a starting point for understanding why some plans arc more likely to fail than others.

In order to grasp the course of events more easily, we tend to reduce the countless infinitesimal forces making up the elemental force to a single cause. After all, it is impossible to enumerate innumerable actions. And so historians and social scientists naturally look for some super-cause that sums up all those small actions. They may presume laws or postulate narrative neatness. Tolstoy relentlessly exposed the logical fallacies in both forms of simplification, which, at some point, either assume what is to be proven or proceed as if it were already proven.

Historians, social theorists, and biographers favor generalizations or symmetries permitting a clear analysis or simple story. They find what they seek, their success demonstrates not that complexity has been adequately explained but that when a discipline demands a certain sort of explanation it is bound to be “discovered.” In disciplines pretending to be social sciences, it is repeatedly discovered that things are not as complex as they appear.

#### And – independent solvency deficit to the alternative - Without specific detailed description of how the alt can work towards solutions you should be highly skeptical of their critique---colonialism in foreign policy is a specific point of departure

**Bryant 12** ( levi, prof of philosophy at Collins college, Critique of the Academic Left, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

The problem as I see it is that **this is the worst sort of abstraction** (in the Marxist sense) **and wishful thinking**. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ **Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction**. **It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives**. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be **remade to create a workable alternative**. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. **Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶** Our problem is that **we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques** articulated at phase 1 **are right**, **but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems** with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. **In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1.** Yet **this is where everything begins to fall apart.** **Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory** and post-structural theory **can understand**. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? **Who are these things for?** We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and **give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics**. Again, who are these things for? **Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry** and tenure, **than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes** and dudettes, **what are you doing?¶** But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. **We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition** (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” **is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business.** Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. **Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We** almost **never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced**, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. **How**, I wonder, **are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals?** **We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption.** That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ **What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems?** How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? **What is your plan? What is your alternative?** I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. **If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans?** But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” **without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives.** Masturbation.**¶** **“Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation**. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. **We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique?** What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. **Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them.** Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. **None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.**

## 2AC Framework

#### And - Resolved includes debaters and judges as the true agents of the resolution

OED, 1989

“Of persons: determined”

#### The colon proves our interpretation

Peck, 1996 (Frances, University of Ottawa, Ottawa Grammar Guide, <http://www.uottawa.ca/academic/arts/writcent/hypergrammar/punct.html>)

The colon focuses the reader's attention on what is to follow, and as a result, you should use it to introduce a list, a summation, or an idea that somehow completes the introductory idea. You may use the colon in this way, however, only after an independent clause: He visited three cities during his stay in the Maritimes: Halifax, Saint John and Moncton. Their lobbying efforts were ultimately useless: the bill was soundly defeated. My mother gave me one good piece of advice: to avoid wasting time and energy worrying about things I cannot change.

#### Simulation detaches debaters from real world participation and ignores the imperialist basis of our activity

Reid-Brinkley ‘8 (Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department of Communications, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” 2008)

So, within public discourse, how race is coded rhetorically in public deliberation is of critical import.

Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original).116 118 The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

#### Fiat has failed– roleplaying simulates a perfect government charged with nostalgic longing – only new styles of debate away from fiat can help us face the reality of modernity

**Lindsey 12** (Dr Jason, PhD from Columbia University and is currently Associate Professor and Chair of Political Science at St. Cloud State University, Baudrillard’s Simulated Politics and Debord’s Agents of Detournement, journal of baud studies vol 9 nmbr 3)

I. Introduction

For the political scientist, Baudrillard's work on simulation and the hyperreal is prescient. Politics in contemporary times seems very hollow when compared to the past. In democratic political systems debates on policy have given way to increasingly baroque ideological arguments. The "issues" that resonate the most with voters are generally symbolic or cultural disputes disconnected from economic management or social welfare. Scholarly evidence for this trend continues to accumulate. A good example is the work Lau and Heldman (2009) which builds on earlier research by Lau in (Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen (1980). From this perspective politics, at least in the most developed countries, increasingly resembles Baudrillard's interaction of simulacra.

Before his death, Baudrillard frequently pointed out the ironies of contemporary politics. Consider his statement about the French vote on the EU’s Constitutional treaty in 2005: “The vote is fixed. If the ‘no’ side wins the day this time, they will make us vote again (as in Denmark and Ireland) until the ‘yes’ wins. We may as well vote yes right now” (Baudrillard, 2006). Here there is the sense that this is not what politics and a referendum are, but this is what they have come to be. In most of our political systems we see similar hints that something is not the way it was. What are the tangible differences between left and right wing administrations? Would a left or right government in France handle the EU differently? In the United States, Presidents as vastly different as Obama and Bush dealt with the 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath with a continuity of policies. So when we vote, what are we doing? What are the actual options we are choosing between?

Baudrillard’s perspective fits well with a growing commentary on the emptiness at the heart of contemporary politics. Zizek in his recent (2008) writing on violence points to the curious demands of young rioters in Paris’ banlieus in October 2005. That is, they did not seem to have any demands beyond the spasm of violence in which they engaged. A similar incoherence can be observed at anti globalization protests. People are angry and want to do something about it. However, they seem unable to coherently explain what it is that has them so angry. The spasms of violence that break out on the periphery of any large protest nowadays also points to a frustration with current politics. Most recently, we have seen the Occupy Wall Street protests successfully capture the attention of a very large audience. However, these protests failed to articulate a coherent political program. In his visit to the group camped out in New York, Zizek pointed out this shortcoming when he was invited to speak. As he put it, “We know what we do not want. But what do we want?” (Zizek, 2011).

If there are no substantive policy differences between parties anymore, then, as Baudrillard would expect, we have to invent some. Witness the entire pop culture industry in the United States devoted to the mythology of Conservatives and Liberals. This industry now embraces books, television, radio, and the Internet, as well as satirical greeting cards in either flavor. Here again is the sense that these examples are not real politics. Instead, we have cultural products that seem to be the very definition of Baudrillard’s simulacra. But how do we know this?

If all politics is just being played out within the hyperreal, that is, politics are just combinations of signs and simulacra, then why do we have a sense that this is not “real” politics? Why do referendums seem so empty to us? Why are we able to organize protests, but then have the sense that we failed to define a “real” concrete program? Furthermore are signs and simulacra powerful enough to inspire individuals to the point of political violence? Baudrillard would most likely argue that violence on the periphery of politics is not inspired by the interaction of simulacra. Instead, this violence represents a frustration and impatience with politics. For Baudrillard, the possibility of a contemporary, active politics is very slim. Thus, we should expect to see indifference or frustration. However, if that is the case, then how do we explain the motivation of some individuals for engaging in this empty politics to the point of extremism?

To explain this tension, we should examine evidence of a politics capable of referencing something outside of other simulacra. A good pressure point for such an analysis is contemporary use of the modern political tactic of detournement as described by Debord and the situationists. Despite evidence for Baudrillard’s analysis of politics as simulation, the modern political tactic of detournement is still effective. If this is the case, then how can this be explained within Baudrillard’s larger analysis of our contemporary situation?

II. Simulations and Detournement

Recently, a colleague expressed some frustration to me when trying to talk to his students about Che Guevera. Although the students recognized his image, they had no clear idea who Che was. As Baudrillard and others would expect, they knew the image of Che from our consumer culture, but could not articulate who he was. Yet, they still knew his image was associated with subversive activities and radical politics.

This sort of incident illustrates an important point about images; they are double edged. Since the image can be disconnected from its initial context, we have the possibility of DeBord and the Situationists' detournement. We can recycle and re cut the image (like the "culture jamming" of the Ad Busters) to create new messages [culture-jamming] that are communicable through the cultural terrain (see www.adbusters.org). On the other hand, given Baudrillard’s description of our contemporary situation, how plausible is detournement since images are indeed detached? More concretely, how far removed can a given image be before it has lost both its "official" meaning and its reprogrammed "subversive" one? Does this problem indicate that we must consider the timing of detournement activities? Must we create the subversive use of the image while there is still a consciousness of the image's original intent?

Furthermore, if there is an element of timing necessary for detournement, then we must consider the following sort of analysis. Why are some images more deeply ingrained with their initial intent? In turn, such deeper images may retain a possible subversive or detournement meaning for a longer period as well. If some images can be used for a longer period, then does this challenge Baudrillard's assertions that there is no meaning left beyond simulation? If there is no meaning behind the image, then why are some still useable in both "official" and "subversive" modes for a much longer period than others?

Does the possibility of detournement mean that there is some truth to our sense of contemporary politics being a simulation of "real politics”? The ability of detournement to expose the real meaning behind advertising and other public statements suggests that we still possess an ability to understand the authentic when we see it. How else can one explain detournement's continuing effectiveness?

Baudrillard indicates in his work Simulations that this is the wrong question to ask. According to Baudrillard: "We are witnessing the end of perspective and panoptic space (which remains a moral hypothesis bound up with every classical analysis of the 'objective' essence of power), and hence the very abolition of the spectacular” (Baudrillard, 1983:54). Thus, Baudrillard thought that we had already entered (in the 1980's) a period later than the society of the spectacle that Debord describes in the 1960's. The idea of any remaining ground or foundation from which one could engage in Debord's neo Marxist analysis has already disappeared according to Baudrillard.

From this perspective, there is no relationship or channel of manipulation to unmask. The relationship between media and us (the audience) has collapsed to the point that Baudrillard sees no space between the two. In, Simulations, Baudrillard speaks explicitly about television (Ibid.:55-58). Already in 1983 he is concerned that reality television meant that there was no longer a subject with perspective. So, to Baudrillard, Debord's analysis is already obsolete because we are no longer an audience to a spectacle but instead we are a part of simulation. Thus for Baudrillard, the real has been replaced by the hyperreal.

However, if Baudrillard is correct, then shouldn't detournement become ineffective? If the distance needed for a relationship like Debord's spectacle has collapsed, then how could the dialectic of recuperation and detournement still be possible? For Baudrillard the answer would appear to be that Debord's concept is impossible. Anything that appears to us now as detournement is most likely a simulation of that process. Recuperation and detournement are collapsed categories just like every other possible anchor in the hyperreal. Indeed, Baudrillard seems borne out to some extent when we consider the efforts of companies and products to establish "street cred". These efforts range from advertising that engages in self-parody to the planting of grass roots reviews on websites. Thus, the idea of detournement, or perhaps we should say authentic, non-simulated detournement seems obsolete.

Debord himself indicates that detournement relies on some sort of ground or context. Hence, his second law of detournement, "The distortions introduced in the detourned elements must be as simplified as possible, since the main impact of detournement is directly related to the conscious or semiconscious recollection of the original contexts of the elements" (Debord and Wolman [1956] 2006). If Baudrillard is correct in his description of the hyperreal, then it is hard to see how this original context can survive.

Yet, despite Baudrillard's criticism, there is evidence of Debord's dialectic functioning in contemporary culture. Writing in the late 1950's, Debord and Wolman argued that a growth in detournement would become visible in the arts through, "an increasingly extensive transformation of phrases or plastic works that happen to be in fashion" (Ibid.:3). This observation triggers several associations with contemporary culture such as the pervasive sampling that makes up current music, books that stitch together different cultural worlds, (such as Pride and Prejudice and Zombies) or television sitcoms such as The Office, which styles itself like a reality program. Furthermore, some images and pieces of culture retain enough meaning that they can easily be turned into a "subversive" mode. How is this possible unless there remains enough relationship and connection to areas outside of simulation?

Perhaps Baudrillard could argue that these acts of resistance are simply wheels within wheels. The evidence we see of Debord's dialectic is simply the dramatic narrative of the simulation we know. With this interpretation, the hyperreal can retain the dramatic elements and themes of an earlier time, even though this is now unhinged from meaning. However, this solipsistic position ignores much evidence from contemporary culture.

For example, we can see the dynamic of Debord's detournement and recuperation at work in several areas of contemporary, popular culture. Consider these recent manifestations of cultural recuperation: Motorcycles and motorcycle gang style- now co-opted into brand named superstores; punk rock and punk rock music- co-opted in the 1990's through grunge and alternative labels; or Goth subculture- co-opted both in popular television and movies and mainstream cosmetics that now feature Goth style colors in lipstick etc. Thus Debord's dynamic of detournement and recuperation seems to still be going strong.

Two intertwining poles of agency explain this dynamic’s motive force. The first pole (or it could be the second) of this dynamo are strategic, market calculations (recuperation revives failing street cred and hence sales). The second pole (though we might prefer that it be the first), are artistic imperatives (detournement carves out a space for creativity and, hence, originality). Yet, where is such agency to be found in Baudrillard's view?

In Baudrillard's broader work the simulacra he describes appear to feed off of each other. Yet this view seems sorely lacking in human agency. In a classic, broad reflection on perception and memory Bergson states, "The function of the body is not to store up recollections, but simply to choose, in order to bring back to consciousness, by the real efficacy thus conferred on it, the useful memory, that which may complete and illuminate the present situation with a view to ultimate action" (Bergson, 1991:179). Indeed, if the goal of an actor within Debord's dialectic is action, then she chooses some images and symbols with purpose. This dimension of strategy and tactics is missing from Baudrillard's analysis because it is, again to him, the wrong perspective. In contrast, detournement is at its core for Debord, a tool or tactic of class struggle and for defeating the remains of modernism in the arts. Such a program or cause is obsolete to Baudrillard given his view of our contemporary situation.

Another way to pose this difference between the two thinkers is to compare Debord's idea of the "spectacle" to Baudrillard's idea of "the system of objects". The chapter on advertising in Baudrillard's The System of Objects, brings out an important distinction between Baudrillard and Debord (Baudrillard, [1968] 1996:164-196). The discussion develops into an exploration of the mass psychology of advertising. Baudrillard argues that the rational claims made in advertising are not really believed by any of us. Instead, they provide a rationalization for purchases that we desire due to non-rational motivations. Baudrillard sees advertising as a surface phenomenon of the system of objects that we live within. The key difference between Baudrillard's description of this vast economic, political, and ideological system of consumption from Debord turns upon agency.

Debord still sees the spectacle as a force that can be countered with tactics such as detournement. In contrast, Baudrillard sees the system of objects as a more pervasive whole into which we are psychologically integrated. The idea of individual agency leading to some sort of resistance begins to look in Baudrillard's conception like the rebelliousness of a child, rather than the acts of Debord's class conflict.

So, where has this discussion taken us in thinking about politics and the simulation of politics? Debord and Wolman argue under the second law of detournement that it indeed requires a context but that this is, "only a particular case of a general law that governs not only detournement but also any other form of action in the world. The idea of pure absolute expression is dead" (Debord and Wolman [1956] 2006). Thus, for Debord this context can be as mythical, metaphysical, or ideological as its audience is capable of comprehending.

Signs and simulacra in such a context suggest the stage of “sorcery” within Baudrillard's precession of simulacra. Could this be a good way of thinking about contemporary politics as a closed system of obscurantist meanings? From this perspective, detournement could still be alive in pockets of the hyperreal where individuals still participate within a bounded envelope of ideology. Within this context signs can profoundly refer to other signs for the initiated.

On the other hand, how believable is the idea that contemporary politics is an obscurantist system for the initiated, since politics involves mass behavior? Can such a view explain the agency and motivation we still encounter among political entrepreneurs that emerge from the grassroots? How can we explain the efforts at detournement we still see in society from below, as well as successful examples of recuperation?

III. Baudrillard, Debord, and Nostalgia

A possible path of reconciliation between these two positions is to consider Baudrillard's discussion of nostalgia. Baudrillard discusses in several of his later writings the prevalence for nostalgia in contemporary culture. Furthermore, our recent visions of the future seem to be ones where individuals are looking back upon us. The most obvious versions of this nostalgia for Baudrillard are books and films where, in a post apocalyptic setting; the survivors walk around the debris of our contemporary world.

In this sense there is a context in Baudrillard when he examines contemporary ideas of the future. The odd nostalgia he describes comes from us, human agents, trying to imagine the outcome of our contemporary actions. From this perspective, our unease is not due to the style or practice of contemporary politics, but to an underlying intuition about the failure of politics. Contemporary humanity faces the possibility of catastrophic risk. The shadow of ecological disaster is especially present in the minds of most of us.

Nostalgia then is something we feel for what politics was. Perhaps detournement continues to work because many of us long for modern (as opposed to contemporary) politics with its clarity of class conflict and ideologies that revolved around the role of the free market. Thus, we still respond to detournement actions that reference this earlier context. Furthermore, many of us prefer to still practice and participate in politics bounded by this context.

Yet, we suspect that this is simulation, not because it is "unreal" but because politics in this sense does not address the most urgent issues that should be political. Instead, with our politics locked into this modern context, the urgent issues of climate change, pollution, technological risk, and mass scale terrorism become topics for culture. Thus, we see the nostalgia for the "society that was", our current one, in literature and film with post apocalyptic themes.

Nostalgia is also a defense or a coping mechanism. What agency do any of us possess within our contemporary context? Because we sense the futility of politics, as we know it within this contemporary setting, we retreat to behaving as if the old context, with its familiar categories and practices, still exists. Because we behave this way, it does continue to exist but at a cost. We soldier on within a modern politics that is increasingly detached from the constraints (ecological, economic, and biological) of our existence. This closed system of modern politics goes on in a ritualistic fashion, despite our growing frustration, and awareness, of its inability to address our common problems.

Recent commentary that criticizes the whole idea of detournement and Baudrillard’s analysis reflects this desire for politics as it was. In their book, Nation of Rebels, Heath and Potter argue that Baudrillard and Debord have created a closed ideology (Heath and Potter, 2004). From this critical perspective, they argue that there is no system performing recuperation. Instead, by collapsing the categories of the political and the cultural, many on the left have fallen into a bottomless trap. They continue to try and create a counterculture that simply sells more lifestyle product, while failing to attend to “real” politics. Real politics being the incremental policy changes that create results as in the past.

Is this a devastating critique? Or is this nostalgia for the politics that was? The examples Heath and Potter give of positive change, the American Civil Rights Movement, the construction of the welfare state, seem like a museum to us now. Is the context for such political activity still with us? Do we live in an era capable of producing such outcomes?

Instead, politics in this sort of analysis begins to resemble religion in that we appeal to it and diligently perform our duties waiting for an intervention that does not come. Have we not performed our roles earnestly enough? Are we neglecting the rites of our fathers? Do we need to switch to another denomination? Should we blame the clergy? And of course some of us begin to have our doubts that any of it matters.

From this perspective, the post apocalyptic nostalgia so prevalent in contemporary culture voices our lurking fears. In these movies and books, our lurking suspicion that contemporary politics fails to address the "real problem" is realized. This is also a reconciliation of Baudrillard and Debord. Detournement still works because we can access this past context. Indeed, we continue to blindly insist that this past social context is still our contemporary home. When our contemporary attempts at politics flounder, because they must confront a very different world today, we try to evaluate their efficacy with this rubric from the past. Why are our governments unable to address the looming ecological crisis? Why don’t our political parties provide us with a range of public policies to choose from?

What do these observations mean for thinking about politics? If Baudrillard and Debord are both accurate in their descriptions, then we seem to be in a moment of political stagnation. The tactics of Debord's detournement remain relevant because we continue to look backward to what politics were. These tactics are successful on one larger point, they temporarily expose our contemporary politics as a simulation of the modern form of politics that was. In this sense, practicing Debord's detournement is a useful activity, but only a first step leading to our contemporary time's pervasive nostalgia. The next step, taking Baudrillard's diagnosis seriously, and developing new forms of politics for our contemporary situation, is a greater challenge (see also Lindsey 2007).

#### State focus fails and eviscerates agency

Grosfoguel, 2000 (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of Califnornia Berkeley, “Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America”, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347-374)

In the capitalist world-system, a peripheral nation-state may experience transformations in its form of incorporation to the capitalist world- economy, a minority of which might even move to a semiperipheral position. However, to break with or transform the whole system from a nation-state level is completely beyond their range of possibilities (Wallerstein 1992a, 1992b). Therefore, a global problem cannot have a national solution. This is not to deny the importance of political interventions at the nation-state level. The point here is not to reify the nation-state and to understand the limits of political interventions at this level for the long-term transformation of a system that operates at a world scale. The nation-state, although still an important institution of historical capitalism, is a limited space for radical political and social transformations. Collective agencies in the periphery need a global scope in order to make an effective political intervention in the capitalist world-system. Social struggles below and above the nation-state are strategic spaces of political intervention that are frequently ignored when the focus of the movements privileges the nation-state. The social movements’ local and global connections are crucial for effective political intervention. The dependentistas overlooked this, due in part to their tendency to privilege the nation-state as the unit of analysis. This had terrible political consequences for the Latin American left and the credibility of the dependentista political project. The political failure contributed to the demise of the dependentista school. The decline of this school enabled the reemergence of old developmentalist ideas in the region. Although the outlined problem was shared by most dependentista theorists, some dependentistas reproduced new versions of the Eurocentric denial of coevalness. Cardoso’s version of dependency theory is a good example.

#### Only we access real policy education – their flawed view of politics replicates ignorance and delegates knowledge to the tip of the political iceberg

Smith, 1997 (Steve, professor of political science at the University of Wales, Review of International Studies, Cambridge journals online)

My central claim is that Wallace has a very restricted notion of politics, such that it seems obvious to him just who are those who 'have to struggle with the dilemmas of power'. For him the political arena is public and it refers to the formal political process, specifically involving the academic in 'speaking truth to power'.I think that there are two fundamental problems with this view of politics. First,it isverynarrowindeed, referring to the activities of elected politicians and policy-makers. It ignores the massive area of political activity that is not focused on theelectoralandpolicy-making processes**,** and the host of 'political' activities that do not accord with the formal processes of politics. His is a very official and formal definition of politics, one that would omit a vast array of political activities. For Wallace, 'political' means having to do with the formal policy process, thereby restricting discussion of politics to a very small subset of what I would define as political.Therefore, Wallace would see detachment where I see engagement; hiding behind the walls of the monastery where I see deep enquiry into the possibilities of the political; and scholasticism where I see intellectual endeavour. Second, and for me more importantly, hisview of politics is narrow because it confines itself to policy debates dealing with areas of disagreement between competingpartypositions**.** The trouble with this view is of course that it ignores the shared beliefs of any era, and so does not enquire into those things that are not problematic for policy-makers. By focusing on the policy debate, we restrict ourselves to the issues of the day, to the tip of the political iceberg**.** Whatpoliticsseems to me to be crucially aboutis how and why some issues are made intelligible as political problems and how others are hidden below the surface(being defined as 'economic' or 'cultural' or 'private'). In my own work I have become much more interested in this aspect of politics in the last few years. I spent a lot of time dealing with policy questions and can attest to the 'buzz' that this gave me both professionally and personally. But I became increasingly aware that the realm of the political that I was dealing with was in fact a very small part of what I would now see as political. I therefore spent many years working on epistemology, and in fact consider that my most political work. I am sure that William Wallace will regard this comment as proof of his central claim that I have become scholastic rather than scholarly, but I mean it absolutely. My current work enquires into how it is that we can make claims to knowledge, how it is that we 'know' things about the international political world. **My main claim is that** International Relations relies overwhelmingly on one answer to this question,namely, an empiricist epistemology allied to a positivistic methodology. This gives the academic analyst the great benefit of having a foundation for claims about what the world is like. It makes policy advice more saleable,especially when positivism's commitment to naturalism means that the world can be presented as having certain furniture rather than other furniture. The problem is that in my viewthis is a flawed version of how we know things; indeed it is in fact a very political view of knowledge,born of the Enlightenment with an explicit political purpose. So much follows politically from being able to present the world in this way; cruciallythe normative assumptions of this move are hidden in a false and seductive mask of objectivity and by the very difference between statements of fact and statements of value that is implied in the call to 'speak truth to power'.For these reasons, I think that the political is a far wider arena than does Wallace. This means that I think I am being very political when I lecture or write onepistemology**.** Maybe thatdoes not seem political to those who define politics as the public arena of policy debate**;** but I believe that my workhelps uncover the regimes of truth within which that more restricted definition of politics operates**.** In short, I think that Wallace'sview of politics ignores its most political aspect, namely, the production of discourses of truth which are the very processes that create the space for the narrower version of politics within which he works.My work enquires into how the current 'politics' get defined and what (political) interests benefit from that disarming division between the political and the non-political. In essence,how we know things determines what we see, and the public realm of politics is itself the result of a prior series of (political) epistemological moves which result in the political being seen as either natural or a matter of common sense.

#### We’re a prerequisite to effective policies

Johnson, 1985 (John J. Johnson, professor emeritus of Latin American history at Stanford, “One Hundred Years of Historical Writing on Modern Latin America by United States¶ Historians”, The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Nov., 1985), pp. 745-765, JSTOR)

Recent publications in diplomatic history do not bode well. There has been a strong tendency to ground arguments more in ideological conviction than in empirical data. Researchers have chosen to deal with the practical rather than the theoretical aspect of policy formation and implementation. There remains surprisingly little agreement on identifying the basic issues, to say nothing of how they should be studied. Official documents have been downgraded to the point that they figure only marginally in most studies, those of Bryce Wood being major exceptions. Relying upon quantitative methodologies and dependency themes, many authors may have overemphasized economic stakes as the principal factor in explaining foreign policy behavior. The ranks of those who would sustain the politico-security argument have been significantly reduced.